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PSEUDOCLEFTS CROSSLINGUISTICALLY*

Pseudoclefts have been divided into two types, specificational and predicational (Akmajian 1970; Higgins 1979). The two types differ in interpretive as well as syntactic characteristics. In this paper we argue that the availability of the specificational type depends on the particular lexical items that a language employs to form pseudoclefts. We discuss the significance of these findings for linguistic theory.

1. Two Types of Pseudoclefts

A pseudocleft construction is an ordinary copular sentence with a free relative in one of the copular positions and a phrase in the other copular position modifying that free relative. Examples such as the following are typically called pseudoclefts:

(1) [What he ate] was an apple.

(2) [What John did] was shave himself.

(3) [What they are] is silly.

Since Akmajian (1970) pseudoclefts are divided into two types: 'predicational' and 'specificational'.[1] Many pseudoclefts are ambiguous between the two types and their interpretations vary according to the type. Consider example (4):

(4) What John is is silly.

On the specificational reading the sentence says 'John is silly', that is, a property is predicated of John. On the predicational reading the wh-phrase may refer to some job or position that John holds, and the sentence says

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[1] Although there is also an oral tradition that uses the term "pseudoclefts" only for the specificational ones. However, we will follow Akmajian, as well as the other authors cited, in making this terminological distinction.

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of it that it is silly. Hence, the sentence says nothing about John directly. Instead, a property is predicated of a property of John.

Given the ambiguity arising in these cases, the question is how we can tell the two types apart. This question is discussed extensively in Higgins (1979), according to whom only specificational pseudoclefts exhibit the phenomenon of 'connectedness'. Connectedness refers to "certain types of cooccurrence restrictions [that] obtain between elements in the subject clause of the pseudocleft sentence and elements in the focus constituent" (p. 22). Informally, connectedness is exhibited by a pseudocleft (which is a "disconnected" or "broken up" sentence) when it behaves with respect to certain syntactic phenomena like its "connected" counterpart (e.g., the "connected" counterpart of (4) is *John is silly*). One such diagnostic, and the one that Higgins relies on the most, involves binding. In particular, only specificational pseudoclefts exhibit connectedness with respect to binding:

(5) What John is is important to himself (specificational only)
= John is important to himself

Note that binding of the reflexive in (5) is not expected since it is not c-commanded by its antecedent. Essentially the reflexive in (5) acts as if it was inside the free relative in terms of binding; and this is what Higgins (1979) means by syntactic connectedness.[2] On the other hand, no such connectedness is observed in predicational pseudoclefts, as shown in (6):

(6) What John is is important to him (predicational only)
= some property which John has is of importance to him

The reader is referred to Higgins (1979) for more behavioral differences between the two types and for his proposal that specificational pseudoclefts are essentially lists (i.e., (4) on the specificational reading is argued to mean 'John is the following: silly').

Higgins discusses the two readings of pseudoclefts in English, and his assumption is that the two readings are universally available. However, we have found that there is crosslinguistic variation with respect to the availability of the specificational reading. Languages that behave like English are German, Welsh, Brazilian Portuguese, Galician, and Spanish. However, in Modern Greek (MG), Italian, Catalan, Finnish, Bulgarian,

[2] Higgins has no explanation for the connectedness effects. Heycock and Kroch (1996) discuss the puzzle imposed by the binding properties of specificational pseudoclefts and show that these cases cannot be reduced to reconstruction. Jacobson (1994) also discusses connectedness but for (superficially) different sentences.

and Polish, a sentence like (4) is not ambiguous and has only the predicational reading. We argue that this lack is the result of the particular lexical items which these languages use to form pseudoclefts. Our discussion will focus primarily on MG, but our proposal can be extended to the other languages of this group.

2. Pseudocleft Constructions in MG

There are two ways to form a pseudocleft in MG.[3] The first one is with the pronoun used in free relatives,[4] which we will retain unglossed for the time being:

(7) [oti kani] ine xazo
OTI (s/he) does is silly

The second way is with the form *afto pu*, which is composed of the neuter demonstrative pronoun *afto* plus the relative complementizer *pu*, and which literally means 'this which':

(8) [afto pu kani] ine xazo
this which (s/he) does is silly

With neither form is it possible to construct a sentence like (4) with the specificational meaning, that is, with the meaning 'John is silly'. The same holds in Italian, Finnish, and so forth.

In addition to the absence of the specificational reading, MG behaves as if it lacks the connectedness effects, which are the characteristic of specificational pseudoclefts. One type of connectedness one might expect regards Case assignment.

The difference between the two types of pseudoclefts surfaces in some languages as a difference in the Case marking of the postcopular element when this element is a noun phrase. German is such a language. Thus, on the specificational reading the postcopular element is marked with Accusa-

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[3] It should be made clear at this point that sentences like (i) are not pseudoclefts but embedded interrogatives:

(i) [To ti ine o Kostas] ine fanero
the what is the Kostas is obvious
'What Kostas is is obvious.'

(i) does not mean that Kostas's profession or function is obvious but that the answer to the question "What is Kostas?" is obvious. This is exactly the semantics of an embedded question.

[4] For the purpose of this paper we will confine ourselves to the free relative pronoun in the neuter, which is the one that corresponds most closely to English *what*.

tive Case, that is, the Case it would receive in the "connected" sentence *Hans wanted to eat an apple*. On the predicational reading it is marked with Nominative, the Case assigned to a postcopular predicative noun:

(9) a. Was Hans essen wollte war einen Apfel.
what Hans eat wanted was an apple-Acc
'What Hans wanted to eat was an apple.' (specificational)

b. Was Hans essen wollte war ein Apfel.
what Hans eat wanted was an apple-Nom
'What Hans wanted to eat was an apple.' (predicational)

We might expect to find a similar Case distinction in MG. On the specificational reading we would expect Accusative Case on the postcopular noun phrase since it is the complement of the verb in the precopular phrase, whereas on the predicational reading we would expect Nominative Case. However, it seems that there is no Case appropriate for the specificational reading in MG, as illustrated in (10):

(10) Afto pu agapai o Kostas perisotero ston kosmo
this which loves Kostas more in the world
ine o skilakos tu/ *ton skilako tu
is his doggie-Nom/*his doggie-Acc
'What Kostas loves most in the world is his doggie.'

Before we proceed to a discussion of connectedness effects with respect to binding in MG, we need to give some background information concerning predicative constructions in this language. Predicative structures in MG always require agreement:

(11) a. O Kostas ine perifan**os**
Kostas is proud-Masc/Nom/Sg

b. I Maria ine perifan**i**
Mary is proud-Fem/Nom/Sg

c. Ta pedhia ine perifan**a**
The children are proud-Neut/Nom/Pl

(11) shows that the adjectival predicate in a copular sentence must be inflected for Gender, Case, and Number. Gender and Number are the relevant features for our purposes. Given this fact about predicative structures, we would expect that the agreement on the adjective in a pseudocleft construction would depend on the reading. In other words, we might expect

connectedness with respect to agreement. An examination of (12) and (13), however, shows that neither of the two ways of forming a pseudocleft is compatible with the agreement expected in the specificational type. This is illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (12a, b) and (13a, b).

(12) a.* Oti ine o Kostas ine arostos
OTI-Neut/Sg is Kostas-Masc/Sg is sick-Masc/Sg
'What Kostas is is sick.' (specificational)

b.* Oti ine ta pedhia ine arosta
OTI-Neut/Sg are the children-Neut/Pl is sick-Neut/Pl
'What the children are is sick.' (specificational)

c. Oti ine o Kostas ine spanio
OTI-Neut/Sg is Kostas-Masc/Sg is rare-Neut/Sg
'What Kostas is is rare.' (predicational)

d. Oti ine ta pedhia ine spanio
OTI-Neut/Sg are the children-Neut/Pl is rare-Neut/Sg
'What the children are is rare.' (predicational)

(13) a.* Afto pu ine o Kostas ine arostos
this-Neut/Sg which is Kostas-Masc/Sg is sick-Masc/Sg
'What Kostas is is sick.' (specificational)

b.* Afto pu ine ta pedhia ine
this-Neut/Sg which are the children-Neut/Pl is
arosta
sick-Neut/Pl
'What the children are is sick.' (specificational)

c. Afto pu ine o Kostas ine spanio
this-Neut/Sg which is Kostas-Masc/Sg is rare-Neut/Sg
'What Kostas is is rare.' (predicational)

d. Afto pu ine ta pedhia ine
this-Neut/Sg which are the children-Neut/Pl is
spanio
rare-Neut/Sg
'What the children are is rare.' (predicational)

(12) illustrates an example of pseudoclefts formed by the neuter pronoun used in free relatives, whereas (13) is an example of pseudoclefts formed by the demonstrative. On the specificational reading, the subject of the predicate is *Kostas*-Masc/Sg in (12a) and (13a). Therefore, given the required agreement in (12a) and (13a), agreement on the postcopular adjective would be expected to be Masculine/Singular. If the subject of the predicate becomes *ta pedhia*-Neut/Pl, then the expected agreement is Neuter/Plural. On the other hand, on the predicational reading the expected agreement is with the elements *afto*-Neut/Sg / *oti*-Neut/Sg, hence always in the Neuter/Singular. The ungrammaticality of (12a, b) and (13a, b) is expected given the unavailability of the specificational type in MG.

Finally, let us turn to connectedness with respect to binding behavior. Binding of a reflexive is not possible, as indicated by (14a), whereas such binding is, of course, possible in a simple sentence like (14b):

(14) a.* Afto pu ine o Kostas$_i$ ine erotevmenos me
this which is Kostas is enamored-Masc with
ton-eafto-tu$_i$
himself
'What Kostas is is enamored with himself.' (specificational)

b. O Kostas$_i$ ine erotevmenos me ton-eafto-tu$_i$
Kostas is enamored-Masc with himself
'Kostas is enamored with himself.'

However, we cannot use the contrast in (14) to conclude that MG lacks connectedness with respect to binding and thereby have one more argument against the existence of specificational pseudoclefts in MG. (14a) remains ungrammatical even if the reflexive is missing, as shown in (15a), whereas the equivalent simple sentence is again perfectly grammatical, as (15b) illustrates:

(15) a.* Afto pu ine o Kostas ine erotevmenos
this which is Kostas is enamored-Masc
'What Kostas is is enamored.' (specificational)

b. O Kostas ine erotevmenos
Kostas is enamored-Masc
'Kostas is enamored.'

This indicates that the ungrammaticality of (14a) has nothing to do with the presence of the reflexive but with the impossibility of achieving the

agreement configuration required for the specificational pseudocleft in MG. What, in fact, is impossible to achieve is to get the postcopular adjective to predicate of *Kostas*.

In sum, MG behaves interpretively and syntactically as if it lacks pseudoclefts of the specificational type.

3. But Why?

3.1. *Background Assumptions*

Before we proceed to discuss the reasons for the observed behavior in MG, we need to lay out some of our background assumptions.

Assumption I: *Pseudoclefts differ regarding the status of the wh-phrase.* Williams (1983) and following him Partee (1986), Heggie (1988), and Heycock (1991), among others, argue that in the specificational pseudocleft the wh-constituent is the predicate, whereas in the predicational pseudocleft the wh-phrase is the subject of predication (the reader is referred to these works for the arguments, which we cannot reproduce here for reasons of space):

(16) a. *Specificational pseudocleft*: $[\text{Wh} \ldots]_{\text{predicate}}$ BE $\text{XP}_{\text{subject}}$
b. *Predicational pseudocleft*: $[\text{Wh} \ldots]_{\text{subject}}$ BE $\text{XP}_{\text{predicate}}$[5]

For the time being, we will assume that (16a) exhaustively describes specificational pseudoclefts. However, in the last section of the paper we will come back to this point.

Assumption II: *Quantifiers*[6] *cannot function as predicates*, as shown by Barwise and Cooper (1981) as well as Keenan and Stavi (1986), among others:

(17) *John is every student in my class. (from Partee 1986)[7]

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[5] (16b) is also the representation of a predicational pseudoclefts for Higgins (1979).

[6] Here we adhere to the position that not everything with a determiner is a quantifier; within this view, nonspecific indefinites contribute a variable to the representation, as in, among others, Heim (1982).

[7] But Partee (1986) also notes that property quantification (as she puts it, with "property-denoting NPs") is possible:

(i) John is everything his mother wanted him to be.

What is the difference between (17) and (i)? Possibly the difference lies in that in (i), the variable left after quantifier raising ranges over properties and is therefore of the

The reader is referred to the aforementioned references for why quantificational phrases are unable to function as predicates. For present purposes we will take "predicate" to mean a constituent which contributes a variable to the representation and over which lambda abstraction can occur. It is easily shown that quantifiers cannot do this:

(18) * In Semantics II, all the/most students are usually tall.

(19) * In Semantics II, every student is usually tall.

In (18, 19) the QPs *Q student* cannot restrict the adverb, and since *tall* is not interpretable as varying over time, the temporal meaning of the adverb is also unavailable, resulting in ungrammaticality.[8]

We will hence be assuming that quantifiers cannot be predicates.

Assumption III: *Free relative pronouns* what *and* whatever *do not have the same meaning*, as argued by Bresnan and Grimshaw (1979), Larson (1987), Tredinnick (1995), but contra Jacobson (1993), Rullmann (1995). Unlike *what*, *whatever* has been argued to have universal quantificational force. This position, in combination with Assumptions I and II, predicts that *whatever* free relatives will not be able to participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts, since as quantificational elements they will not be able to behave predicatively, a prerequisite for the free relative component of a specificational pseudocleft. This prediction is borne out:

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appropriate type to be in the frame. On the other hand, the variable left after QR in (17) ranges over individual students in my class. What is wrong about such a variable in the frame 'John is x'? If x received the value of each student per individual assignment, shouldn't (17) be grammatical and have the interpretation that John is the only student in my class? But that's not what happens; the reader is referred to the work of Partee for more on this question. What is relevant for present purposes is that the existence of sentences like (i) should not serve as a general counterexample to our Assumption II, since their availability is restricted to nouns that range over properties only.

[8] The discussion here should not be confused with the weak/strong distinction of quantifiers as defined by their (in)ability to appear in the *There is . . .* frame (Milsark 1977). For example, a definite marked NP like *the students* can restrict an adverb; so (i) can mean that most students are tall:

(i) In Semantics II, the students are usually tall.

This would indicate that the open position of *students* does not get closed off by the definite determiner. The fact that *the students* cannot appear in *there is* constructions can be attributed to a variety of factors; e.g. it could be argued that *there is* required not just a variable, but a variable whose content is new and not presupposed. See Prince (1992) for arguments in favor of the position that the *there is* construction is restricted to constituents with new information. See Heim (1982) for arguments in favor of the position that both indefinite and definite marked NPs can contribute a variable; for the former the content of the variable is asserted, for the latter it is presupposed.

(20) a. What(*ever) John is is proud. (specificational pseudocleft)
b. Whatever John is is worthwhile/rare.
(predicational pseudocleft)

The status of (20a) shows that *whatever* cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts, while *what* can. This is a very significant difference between them. It would be inexplicable if indeed their semantics were the same.[9, 10] The reader is referred to the works cited earlier for arguments in favor of the position that *whatever* is a universal quantifier.[11] Here, we will only discuss the arguments from Jacobson (1993), which are meant to show that *whatever* does not behave like a universal quantifier. We will show that the data can and, in one case, must be explained differently, permitting us to adopt the earlier claim about *whatever* having universal force. The following are, according to Jacobson, the differences between *whatever* and a universal quantifier (all the examples are taken from Jacobson 1993):

1. Universals can be modified by *nearly* or *almost* (as in Carlson 1981), but *whatever* cannot:

(21) a. For years, I did nearly/almost everything/anything you told me to do.
b.*For years, I did nearly/almost whatever you told me to do.

2. Universals license NPIs, whereas *whatever* does not:[12]

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[9] Jacobson (1993) notes that *whatever* free relatives cannot function as predicates but does not claim to know why, although she does claim that "this restriction seems to be orthogonal to their quantificational force." Rullmann (1995) does not mention that *whatever* cannot appear in free relatives contained in specificational pseudoclefts. He explicitly says that *what* and *whatever* free relatives are the same for him, and that they both contain a maximality operator. He then has a type-shifting rule which permits them to become predicates to form specificational pseudoclefts; however, when he shows examples of this, he does not show that *whatever* cannot undergo his type-shifting rule.

[10] This leaves open the following possibilities, which we will not discuss in more detail. First it is possible that *what* never contains a universal quantifier and its exhaustive meaning comes, e.g., from sum formation, as in Jacobson (1993), or from a maximality operator as in Rullmann (1995). Alternatively, *what* can be said to be ambiguous between a definite and a universal quantifier (as argued by Tredinnick 1995).

[11] See Iatridou (1994) for additional arguments in favor of *whenever* having quantificational force on its own.

[12] However, according to Tredinnick (1995), NPIs are possible in *whatever* free relatives:

(i) He got into trouble for what*(ever) he ever did to anyone.
(ii) I will go where*(ever) the hell you go.

(22) a. I can read everything/anything that Bill ever read.
b.*I can read whatever (books) Bill ever read.

3. Universals do not support anaphora by *it* in environments like (23), whereas *whatever* does:[13]

(23) a.*Everyone who went to every/any movie the Avedon is now showing said it was boring.
b. Everyone who went to whatever movie the Avedon is now showing said it was boring.

Let us look at these arguments in turn. First of all, there are other quantifiers with universal force which behave like *whatever* with respect to the first two points. Such quantifiers are *each* and *both*. They cannot be modified by *nearly* or *almost*:

(24) a.*For years, I did nearly/almost each thing you told me to do.
b.*I did almost/nearly both things you told me to do.

At the same time, there are non-universals that do permit modification by *almost* (Tim Stowell, p.c.):

(25) Almost thirty people came to my party.

Moreover, *each* and *both* do not license NPIs (but see fn. 12):

(26) a.*I can read each book that Bill ever read.
b.*I can read both books Bill ever read.

So even though we do not know (and will not address here) what explains this property of *each* and *both*, what is relevant for us is that it shows that we do not necessarily need to conclude on the basis of (21, 22) that *whatever* lacks universal force.

What about the contrast in (23)? Free relatives with *-ever* display a known ambiguity. According to Tredinnick (1995), (27a) is ambiguous between what she calls the 'don't know' reading of *whenever*, represented in (27b), and the 'quantificational' reading, represented in (27c):

Richard Larson has also provided us with examples of free relatives containing NPIs. We will not address the disparity in judgments.

[13] Actually, Jacobson's example with *any* is somewhat misleading because this item could function as an NPI in this environment. On the other hand, if *any* was meant to be an instantiation of free choice *any* in this example, it is not licensed in this environment and the sentence is bad independently of the anaphora.

(27) a. John jumped whenever the fire alarm went off
b. ∃ time t [the fire alarm went off at t & John jumped at t & speaker does not know the value of t]
c. ∀ times t [the fire alarm went off at t] John jumped at t

According to Tredinnick, the meaning of *whatever* on the 'don't know' reading is similar to that of *a certain*, that is, a specific indefinite. In other words, the 'don't know' reading has, as Tredinnick puts it, an existential presupposition associated with it, which is lacking in the quantificational use of *whatever*. We will retain this description of the difference between the two readings but we cannot retain Tredinnick's terminology because, as we will show later, *whatever* behaves quantificationally on both readings. For this reason we will refer to (27b) as the 'speaker's ignorance' reading and to (27c) as the 'conditional' reading.

Let us now consider again the contrast in (23). On a closer look, it becomes evident that (23b) has the speaker's ignorance reading of *whatever*, not the conditional reading. If we construct an example with *whatever* but without the speaker's ignorance reading, anaphora becomes impossible and Jacobson's sentence becomes bad (contrast (23b) to (28)):

(28) * Everyone who talks to whatever woman he meets on the street says she is beautiful.

In other words, pronominal anaphora is possible only with the speaker's ignorance reading of *whatever*. In (23b) the sentence has as part of its presupposition that the Avedon is, indeed, showing some (of course specific) movie. It is this presupposition that licenses the pronoun; that is, we are dealing with a referential pronoun, not a bound variable. On the other hand, (28) does not presuppose that there is a woman on the street. Hence in (28) the pronoun could connect to the quantifier only as a bound variable (not as a referential pronoun), but the requisite c-command configuration is not met. (And donkey-pronouns are not possible with strong quantifiers as putative antecedents.) In other words, the conditional use of *whatever* behaves exactly like a strong quantifier with respect to anaphora.

In sum, we do not consider the arguments in Jacobson (1993) sufficient to destroy earlier claims that *whatever* has quantificational properties.

Interestingly, specificational pseudoclefts with *whatever* are ungrammatical not only on the conditional reading of *whatever*, but also on its speaker's ignorance reading:

(29) * Whatever I like about John is not his sense of humor.

The intended reading in (29) is 'Whatever it is that I like about John, it

isn't his sense of humor'.[14] Why should (29) be impossible? We argue that this is still the result of the quantificational force of *whatever*. In the speaker's ignorance reading, *whatever* quantifies over epistemic worlds. So in a sentence like *Whatever I cooked is green* on the reading 'Whatever it is that I cooked, it is green', *whatever* quantifies over epistemically accessible worlds in which I cooked something. Such worlds will include this thing being green and a tomato, it being green and a potato, and so on. In other words, *whatever* retains its quantificational force on the speaker's ignorance reading and therefore on this reading it cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts. (However, this does not mean that in Jacobson's sentence (23b) the pronoun is licensed by the quantificational force of *whatever*. As we already said, the pronoun in that example is a referential pronoun.)

Having argued that *whatever* cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts because it cannot function predicatively, we should point out that there are environments in which *whatever*-pseudoclefts appear in the *positions* of predicates. However, these are exactly the environments in which *every N* can appear, namely those where the quantification is over properties (see fn. 5):

(30) a. I consider John to be whatever you consider him to be.[15]
b. John is everything I want him to be.

But this pair of sentences points to a similarity between *whatever* and *every* rather than a dissimilarity between the two.[16]

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[14] The ungrammaticality of specificational pseudoclefts with *whatever* on the speaker's ignorance reading is the reported judgment in, among others, Jacobson (1993).

[15] It has often been argued (including in Williams (1983) and Moro (1992)) that when predicate inversion takes place below *consider*, *to be* must appear overtly:

(i) I consider John (to be) the captain.
(ii) I consider the captain *(to be) John.

Independently of the validity of this diagnostic or any explanation for it, it should be noted that the preference of many speakers for *to be* in (30a) should not be taken to indicate that inversion has taken place. If predicate inversion had indeed taken place in (30a), the "uninverted" clause should be acceptable, but it is not – with or without *to be*: **I consider whatever you consider him (to be) John.*

[16] A reviewer posed the question of given that *whatever* free relatives can appear in predicate position in sentences like (30a), why can't they form specificational pseudoclefts like (i):

(i) *Whatever Bill can be is proud of himself.

First of all, we should be certain we make the distinction between something *appearing in the position of a predicate* and something *being a predicate*. As we said in fn. 5, a quantificational expression can appear in the position of a predicate as long as the variable left

In summary, we assume that *-ever* wh-words cannot function predicatively. As a result, they cannot participate in specificational pseudoclefts, where the free relative must function as predicate.

3.2. *Modern Greek*

3.2.1. Oti *Pseudoclefts*

Recall that one way to form a pseudocleft in MG is with the (neuter) free relative pronoun *oti*:

(31) Oti ine o Kostas ine spanio
OTI-Neut/Sg is Kostas is rare-Neut/Sg

And as we have already seen, *oti*-free relatives can only form predicational pseudoclefts.

It can be shown that *oti* behaves like *whatever*, not like *what*.[17] Some similarities will be discussed later in the paper; for the time being, note that, for example, *oti*-constituents cannot restrict adverbs of quantification:[18]

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after quantifier raising ranges over properties. But this does not mean that the entire quantificational phrase *is* a predicate or would have to be so in order for (i) to be possible.

Also, note that while *everything I want him to be* can appear in the position of a predicate in (30b), it cannot form a sentence like the reviewer's (i) for the same reasons:

(ii) *Everything Bill can be is proud of himself.

But of course this does not subtract from the fact that *everything* is a universal quantifier, nor from the fact that it can appear in *the position of* a predicate when the variable left after QR ranges over properties and the conditions mentioned in fn. 5 are satisfied.

A further question would be why (i, ii) cannot be formed *after* QR has applied. The answer to this reduces to the discussion about (47) later in the main text. It is in general not possible for quantifiers to appear in such sentences, and it does not help if the variable left after QR is of the appropriate type:

(iii) * Most of the things I cooked are this hamburger, this salad and this baklava.
(iv) * Most of the things John can be are stupid, proud and arrogant.

[17] Through this section we will be pointing to distributional similarities between *oti* and *whatever*. For reasons of space we will not discuss what would underlie these similarities beyond what is necessary for our main purpose. For some cases, the (universal) quantificational force of the two items will appear to be the first factor that comes to mind.

[18] Tredinnick (1995) discusses the following data:

(i) When I go to the store I mostly buy potatoes.
(ii) Whenever I go to the store I mostly buy potatoes.

(i) has a reading under which the *when*-clause restricts the adverb *mostly*. Such a reading is absent in (ii), indicating that the *whenever*-clause lacks the variable necessary to function as a restrictive clause. (ii) means 'Every time I go to the store, most of what I buy is potatoes.'

(32) * Oti agorazi ine spania akrivo
whatever (s/he) buys is rarely expensive

Also, *oti*-constituents are incompatible with epistemic modality, which Tredinnick (1995) shows to be the case with *whatever* but not with *what* free relatives ('*' indicates inability of epistemic interpretation of the modal):

(33) a. He does what(*ever) must be a difficult job.
(from Tredinnick 1995)

b.* Kani oti prepi na ine dhiskolo
(s/he) does whatever must be difficult

c.* Oti prepi na simveni eki ine fovero
whatever must happen-3Sg there is horrible

Incidentally, the pattern in (33) also confirms the similarity between *oti/whatever* and elements with universal force. Notice the absence of the epistemic reading in *He does everything that must be a difficult job.*

We conclude, then, that *oti* behaves like *whatever* in a variety of ways and it is therefore not surprising that, like *whatever*, it cannot participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts. We argue that this is due to their universal force, which effectively blocks them from functioning as predicates. The difference between *oti* and *whatever* is that the latter, unlike the former, 'contains' plain *what*, which does not have universal force, or at least, does not have to.

3.2.2. Afto Pu *Pseudoclefts*

The other way of forming pseudoclefts in MG is with *afto pu*, 'this which':

(34) Afto pu ine o Kostas ine spanio
this which is Kostas is rare-Neut

Afto pu pseudoclefts cannot be specificational either, as we have seen. We argue that the reason that *afto pu* relatives cannot form specificational pseudoclefts, that is, cannot function as predicates, is because *afto*, *which* is a demonstrative.[19]

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[19] A reviewer points out that Dutch also shows that the presence of a determiner prevents the formation of specificational pseudoclefts: *dat wat* can only form predicational pseudoclefts, while a *what* pseudocleft is ambiguous:

(i) Wat Jan is is belangrijk. (ambiguous)
'What John is is important.'

According to Kaplan (1989), demonstratives (as a subset of indexicals) are always interpreted as referential terms that refer to something provided by the context. Their value is not shiftable, and it remains unaffected by operators in the sentence. This means that demonstratives will not be able to function as predicates, that is, contribute a variable to the representation. (See also Higgins 1979, ch. 5; Enç 1991).[20, 21]

(ii) Dat wat Jan is is belangrijk. (only predicational)
'That which John is is important.'

And this, of course, means that there is no possible interpretation for (iii) with the presence of the demonstrative:

(iii) (*Dat) wat Jan is is rijk.
'That which John is is rich.'

[20] Unlike deictic elements, the definite article can sometimes be stripped of its function of marking old information, if its presence is required for other reasons. This can be seen by the fact that it can sometimes appear in existential constructions (see Prince 1992):

(i) a. There is the tallest girl you ever saw in the room next door.
b. There was the usual/same crowd at the beach today.

In (ia) the article is used because of the uniqueness associated with the superlative; in (ib) it is required by the adjectives *usual* and *some*, which cannot be used without the article. However, the demonstrative never loses its marking of old information/specificity and therefore is never able to function as predicate. The aforementioned difference between demonstratives and definite articles also appears in their interaction with adverbs of quantification, which the former cannot restrict (since deictics are referential), but the latter can. Consider (ii) on the reading where the NP restricts the adverb (similar to (18, 19)):

(ii) The women in this neighborhood are seldom tall.

An NP like *the women in this neighborhood* can host an appositive:

(iii) The women in this neighborbood, who have been through so many things, know to vote for Susan.

But when the NP restricts an adverb, it cannot host an appositive:

(iv) *The women in this neighborhood, who have been through a lot, are seldom tall.

In order to host an appositive an NP must be referential. But then it cannot restrict an adverb of quantification. (iv) suffers from this conflict.

[21] Karina Wilkinson (p.c.) and a reviewer have brought up the possibility of (i.B) as a counterexample to the position that demonstratives cannot be predicates:

(i) A: John is tall.
B: Yes, he is that.

But B is not possible in MG (and other languages):

(ii) α: o Yanis ine psilos
the John is tall
β: ne ine (*afto)/(*ekino)
yes, (he) is (*this)/(*that)

We should note that within Higgins' framework there might be another reason for why *afto pu* is excluded from the formation of specificational pseudoclefts. In particular, Higgins (1979: 236) argues that the free relative part of the specificational pseudocleft must be be inherently cataphoric, that is, forward referring (this relates to his conception of specificational pseudoclefts as lists). Unlike English *this*, which can be both anaphoric and cataphoric (Halliday 1976), MG *afto* (this) is like English *that* in that it can only be anaphoric:

(35) John bought a new car but I would do this/*that: lease a new one.

(36) O Kostas agorase kenurgio aftokinito ala ego tha
Kostas bought new car but I would
ekana to eksis/ *afto/ *ekino: tha nikiaza ena
do the following/ *this/ *that: (I) would rent one

In other words, within this line of reasoning, since *afto pu* is only anaphoric it cannot form specificational pseudoclefts. However, we will continue considering the real culprit for why *afto pu* pseudoclefts cannot be specificational the fact that *afto*, as a demonstrative, cannot function as predicate. The reason for this decision is that the inability to satisfy the content of Assumption I accounts for a larger array of data.

Preliminary conclusions: the availability of the specificational reading in a language depends on the ability of what in English surfaces as the wh-constituent to function as a predicate, and this is not possible in MG (the way it isn't possible with *whatever* in English). Catalan, Italian, Bulgarian, Polish, and Finnish are like MG.

In English but not in MG, then, the demonstrative *that* (note that *this* is worse in B with the word order stated) can stand for a predicate previously mentioned in the discourse. In other words, a demonstrative can be a pro-predicate in English but not in MG. But being a discourse pro-X still means that the element in question is deictic (i.e., referential, among other things) and not necessarily an X, and we should not expect it to be able to automatically appear in all the environments in which its antecedent appears. For example, the fact that the demonstrative can appear as a discourse-deictic element (standing syntactically for an infinitival VP) in D's speech in (iii) does not mean that we should expect it to appear in a sentence like E's:

(iii) C: Did he mail the letter?
D: Yes, he did that.
E: Good. I wanted him to *that/mail it.

In addition, the distribution of *that* as a pro-predicate appears to be quite restricted. For example, it cannot appear with verbs other than BE: **John seems/sounds/etc. that.*

4. How Does the MG Situation Generalize?

The languages that have specificational pseudoclefts form free relatives either with the items used in headed relatives or the items used in questions. In other words, they form free relatives with items that participate in predicative structures. For example, in English, free relatives are formed with a subset of interrogative words, like *what*, *when*, and so on.

On the other hand, MG has a different lexical paradigm for free relatives and this paradigm does not draw from the pool of interrogative words or (headed) relative pronouns. For example, in MG the neuter singular of the form used in free relatives is *oti*; the one used in headed relatives is *to opio* (or *pu*), and the one used in questions is *ti*.

The other way MG and some of the other languages in this group form pseudoclefts is with demonstratives. Demonstrative elements are also not amenable to a predicative function. Note, for example, the difference between Italian, which lacks specificational pseudoclefts, and Spanish, which has them. In Italian they are formed with *quello che* ('that which') and in Spanish with *lo que* ('the which') – recall that the definite determiner does not prevent an NP from functioning as a predicate.

A question that arises is the following: why should a language not have a separate morphological paradigm for free relatives but with the members of this paradigm still being able to function as predicates and participate in specificational pseudoclefts? We have not found a language that takes this strategy, which, of course, does not mean that it does not exist. But if, in fact, the situation generalizes the way the small group of languages that we have looked at does, the question is why that should be the case. We do not have anything significant to say to this, although there may be some notion of functional economy or blocking effect at play: if a predicative element is going to be used, the language is going to use one that it uses in other predicative constructions anyway.

5. Some Harder Cases and the Larger Picture

According to Higgins (1979), the sentence in (37) is a specificational pseudocleft, based on its binding behavior exemplified in (38a), which is similar to that of the "connected" (38b) (Higgins does not discuss why such sentences should not permit the predicational reading).

(37) What John claimed/said was that the earth is flat.

(38) a.*What he_i believed/claimed was that $John_i$ is innocent.
b.*He_i believed/claimed that $John_i$ is innocent.

The status of (37) is of particular interest in the present discussion because MG and the other languages which in the discussion so far behaved as if they lacked specificational pseudoclefts do have sentences like (37), which we will henceforth refer to as 'CP-pseudoclefts', since the second constituent of the copula is a CP:

(39) Afto pu ipe o Kostas ine oti i gi ine epipedhi
this that said Kostas is that the earth is flat
'What Kostas said is that the earth is flat.'

So how do we state the crosslinguistic generalization? Do we say that languages such as MG lack some specificational pseudoclefts but do have some others, e.g. the CP-pseudoclefts?

If one considers Higgins's broader definition that in a specificational sentence, one argument gives the content of the other one, as in *His weight is 170 lbs*, then MG does, of course, have specificational sentences at large, even if it does not have specificational pseudoclefts of the type discussed until this point in the paper. But if MG has CP-pseudoclefts, which are supposed to be specificational, then we need an explanation for how CP-pseudoclefts are different from the ones in (4).

But first we will try to explore the stronger hypothesis that MG lacks specificational pseudoclefts altogether. In order to do this, it would have to be shown that CP-pseudoclefts are not specificational pseudoclefts, or at least that they are ambiguous between the specificational and the predicational type. If this can be shown successfully, then it can be maintained that MG and the other languages like it lack specificational pseudoclefts altogether. We will show below that there are merits to this hypothesis. This inconclusive result is mostly due to our lack of comprehension of the exact nature of the phenomenon of connectedness and the fact that diagnostics for the specificational versus predicational nature of a pseudocleft do not seem to yield uniform results when it comes to CP-pseudoclefts.

Within the "stronger" working hypothesis, the first step that needs to be taken is to evaluate the possibility that Higgins was wrong about CP-pseudoclefts being only specificational and attempt to show that they can also be predicational. There are reasons to believe that the status of CP-pseudoclefts is not uncontroversial. As already mentioned, even though Higgins mostly builds on their different binding effects, he proposes some other diagnostics that distinguish predicational from specificational pseudoclefts (cf. Higgins's ch. 6). According to these tests, the free relative constituent of a pseudocleft can undergo Raising and Subject-Verb Inversion only in predicational, not specificational pseudoclefts (recall that in the

frame '*What John is is x*', the adjective *proud* permits only the specificational reading, while *important* favors the predicational reading):[22]

(40) a.*Is what John is proud?
b. Is what John is important?

(41) a.*What John is seems to be proud.
b. What John is seems to be important.

According to Higgins, CP-pseudoclefts pattern with specificational pseudoclefts with respect to the aforementioned tests. However, we have been unable to replicate these judgments. All the speakers we consulted (about twenty) accepted Raising of the free relative in a CP-pseudocleft (42a) and half of them accepted Inversion (42b):[23]

(42) a. What John believes seem to be that the earth is flat.
b. Is what John believes that the earth is flat?

Moreover, there are at least two more environments in which CP-pseudoclefts pattern with predicational pseudoclefts according to Higgins's own tests. Higgins says that the predicate *turn out* permits a free relative subject only in predicational pseudoclefts, but it appears that it can do so in a CP-pseudocleft, indicating again that CP-pseudoclefts can behave like predicational pseudoclefts:[24]

(43) What John believes turns out to be that the earth is flat.

Also, for Higgins, the copula is just one of the ways to form a specificational sentence. Some other verbs that can do the same thing according to him are *entail, amount to, consist of.* So if his diagnostics test for specificational sentences proper, there should be no difference among those verbs. Yet, CP-pseudoclefts with such verbs can undergo Raising and Inversion:

(44) a. What John claimed/said/believed seems to entail that the earth is flat.
b. Does what John claimed/etc. entail that the earth is that?

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[22] Williams (1983) also discusses these tests (though not with respect to CP-pseudoclefts) and attributes the lack of Raising and Inversion in specificational pseudoclefts to the fact that predicates (in his analysis, the free relative constituent of the pseudocleft) cannot raise.

[23] Since the other tests all indicate that the free relative in CP-pseudoclefts behaves like a referential NP and half the speakers find Inversion also possible, which would point to the same conclusion, we will put aside the variation in judgments concerning (42b). We do not know what this variation is due to.

[24] Higgins has this as a separate test, but possibly it is just one more case of Raising.

In sum, then, CP-pseudoclefts (in English) pattern with specificational pseudoclefts on some diagnostics but with predicational ones on some others. Fortunately, there appears to be a way out of this conflict. As mentioned in fn. 22, Williams (1983) discusses the Raising and Inversion tests of Higgins and argues that the free relative in specificational pseudoclefts cannot undergo Raising and Subject-Verb Inversion because, as a predicate, it cannot undergo the relevant types of movement. We argue that the following is the correct way to look at the larger picture. The Raising and Inversion tests show, if Williams is right, that the free relative of a CP-pseudocleft is not a predicate but a denoting NP. In addition to the Raising and Inversion tests, there are more reasons to believe that the free relative of a CP-pseudocleft is not a predicate but a denoting nominal (specifically, a nominal denoting a proposition). First of all, such a free relative can be modified by propositional predicates, indicating that it can stand for a proposition:

(45) [What John said] is unlikely to be true/impossible.

It can entail other propositions:

(46) [What John said/believes/etc.] entails that the earth is flat.

It can participate in entailments like referential items. Entailments like that in (47a) are only possible when at least one of the two premises contains two referential items. If this fails to be the case, as in (47b), the entailment does not go through:

(47) a. [What John said/believes/etc.] is that Mary stole the tapes.
[What Susan said/believes/etc.] is that Mary stole the tapes.
Therefore, what John said/believes/etc. is what Susan said/believes/etc.

b. John is sick. Susan is sick. #Therefore, John is Susan.

To sum up, the free relative of a CP-pseudocleft behaves as a (proposition) denoting NP. One could argue that on the basis of our Assumption I (following Higgins and Williams) this would automatically entail that CP-pseudoclefts are predicational. We will not yet draw this conclusion, and it will shortly become clear why. First, we need to dispense with a potential issue.

Recall that we are in the process of answering the question whether CP-pseudoclefts can be predicational, and that we have found some evidence that would answer this question in the affirmative. But if CP-pseudoclefts

can be predicational, wouldn't we expect *whatever* and MG *oti* to appear in them? They do not, though:

(48) * Whatever John said/claimed/believed was that the earth is flat

(49) * Oti pistevi o Yanis ine oti i gi ine
whatever believes John is that the earth is
epipedhi
flat

That *oti* and *whatever* pattern alike here is not surprising given that they have been shown to behave similarly in several ways. So should the fact that *whatever/oti* cannot appear in CP-pseudoclefts discourage us from pursuing the possibility that CP-pseudoclefts are predicational? We think not, and here is the reason. If a free relative is a denoting NP, it can appear in any environment in which other referential NPs can appear. One such environment are equative sentences (represented here with BE_{eq}); in fact, there is nothing that would preclude them from doing so:

(50) a. What he got me offended my sister.
b. What he got me fell and broke.
c. What he got me is green.
d. What he got me is_{eq} that apple over there.

Note how reminiscent (50d) is of the interpretation of a specificational pseudocleft. However, there is nothing that prevents the generation of equative sentences with the free relative being a denoting NP (a mark of predicational pseudoclefts for both Higgins and Williams) along the lines of an equative sentence like *Cicero is Tully*. Thus it should be totally expected that referential free relatives be able to form equative sentences; the same holds for free relatives that refer to propositions:

(51) a. What he said offended my sister.
b. What he said is stupid.
c. What he said is_{eq} that the earth is flat.

In other words, referential free relatives can participate, as subjects, in the formation of a variety of sentences, among which are equatives, which yield the same linear string as specificational pseudoclefts.[25] We assume, therefore, that the Greek CP-pseudocleft (49), whose free relative is

[25] This by itself is hardly surprising. We have already seen several pseudoclefts whose surface form can be yielded by different derivations, e.g. *What John is is silly*.

referential, will be an equative sentence. But note that equative sentences cannot contain quantificational elements:[26]

(52) a.*Everything I cooked is this hamburger
b.*Every student in my class is John[27]
c.*Most things I cooked are this hamburger, this salad and this baklava

The same holds when we have equative sentences with propositional arguments:[28]

(53) a.*Every claim that I made is that the earth is flat
b.*Every claim that Bill and Sam made is that the earth is flat

And for the same reason *whatever* cannot participate in equative sentences:

(54) What(*ever) I cooked is this hamburger

It is not surprising, therefore, that whatever and oti cannot appear in equative sentences like (48) and (49) either.

To summarize, then, we need not take the fact that the *whatever* and *oti* cannot appear in CP-pseudoclefts as an argument against the position that the latter are predicational.

So far, we have appealed to tests like Inversion and Raising for arguments in favor of the position that CP-pseudoclefts can be predicational, and we have found a way to make the absence of *whatever* and *oti* from such constructions compatible with this position. We could take these results and combine them with the fact that CP-pseudoclefts are present in languages that have otherwise been shown to lack specificational pseudoclefts and conclude that CP-pseudoclefts are predicational. This would amount to saying that MG and the other languages that behave like it have no specificational pseudoclefts at all. However, there is one major obstacle to drawing this conclusion, and that is the fact that CP-pseudoclefts show connectedness, as was illustrated in (38). We do not claim to understand the nature of connectedness, and integration of this phenomenon into the

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[26] As on a previous occasion, *all* is the expection here. We have already pleaded agnosticism as to the nature of this element.

[27] Partee (1986) and others worry about why *every student in my class* cannot be a predicate. The point here is that *every student in my class* cannot participate in equative sentences even as a subject.

[28] The sentences in (53) in addition show that a given proposition, regardless of how many times it was claimed and how many people it was claimed by, is treated as one proposition (by grammar or the ontology of propositions; it is irrelevant for us which).

present data and analysis will ultimately depend on one's theory of it. However, here we would like to point out that some of the ideas presented in Jacobson (1994) and Sharvit (1997) can be used to our advantage. Jacobson and Sharvit give proposals for connectedness effects that relate to the equation nature of the relevant sentences.[29]

If Jacobson and Sharvit are correct, then there may be a way out of the conflict we have found in CP-pseudoclefts, which behaved like specificational pseudoclefts with respect to binding connectedness but seemed to have referring free relatives, a characteristic of predicational pseudoclefts according to Higgins and Williams and our Assumption I. CP-pseudoclefts were also shown to be derivable as equative sentences (i.e., with a referring free relative NP subject). But as equative sentences, and depending on the exact relation between connectedness and equatives, their binding connectedness may become explainable. This complex of assumptions will permit the existence of a superficially "mixed" type of pseudocleft, one with a referring subject, which therefore will positively undergo the Raising and Inversion tests, but which at the same time will show connectedness effects.[30]

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[29] For Heycock and Kroch (1996) all specificational sentences are equative, an assumption not made here.

[30] Higgins and Williams, as well as the other authors following them, assumed that there is no overlap between the class of pseudoclefts whose free relative behaves as a denoting NP and the class that shows connectedness effects. In fact, Higgins had already described predicational pseudoclefts in the way Williams did, but his specificational ones were different (Higgins 1979, p. 264, partial chart):

(i)	Type	Free Relative	Other Copular Constituent
a.	Predicational	Referential	Predicational
b.	Specificational	Superscriptional	Specificational

Here 'superscriptional' is defined as "the reading that corresponds to the heading of a list" (Higgins, p. 219). Higgins says that 'superscriptional' should not be identified with 'attributive' in the sense of Donnellan (1966, 1968). He notes that there are noun phrases that can be used superscriptionally but not attributively, that is, that attributive NPs are only a subset of the (free relative) NPs that can participate in the formation of specificational pseudoclefts. Effectively, we argued that the sentences that test as specificational on the Raising and Inversion diagnostics are only the ones that Higgins would classify as 'attributive'. The NPs that are superscriptional but not attributive according to Higgins are the free relatives that form part of specificational pseudoclefts like (ii) (see Higgins, pp. 269–270 for details):

(ii) What I don't like about John is his sense of humor.

However, notice that this sentence can undergo Raising and Inversion:

(iii) a. What she doesn't like about John seems to be his sense of humor.
b. What she didn't like about John turned out to be his sense of humor.
c. Is what you don't like about John his sense of humor?

Returning finally to the question of whether MG and the other languages in its group lack some or all types of pseudoclefts, we see that now this question has become one of labelling. What do we call this "mixed" category? Do we use the connectedness effects as the basis of the nomenclature and say that CP-pseudoclefts are specificational? A positive answer would mean that MG has some specificational pseudoclefts after all. On the other hand, we could use as basis the position, proposed first by Higgins and then by Williams, that referring free relatives are the characteristic of predicational pseudoclefts. This would entail that MG has no specificational pseudoclefts at all. The exposition of this paper was based on Assumption I, where the presence of a referring free relative was taken in effect as a definitional characteristic of predicational pseudoclefts. For the sake of terminological consistency, then, the present paper would have to label CP-pseudoclefts as predicational, but this has no substantive significance whatsoever. What, after all, is in a name?

In other words, it seems that these diagnostics make only a subset of Higgins's specificational pseudoclefts come out as specificational, namely only the ones where the free relative behaves as a predicate.

In Higgins's terms, then, MG lacks the pseudoclefts where the free relative behaves as a predicate, but has the ones where the free relative behaves like a superscriptional-nonattributive NP. In additional to the CP-pseudoclefts discussed in the main text, these also include those of the type discussed in this footnote:

(iv) Afto pu dhen m' aresi ston Kosta ine to chiumor tu.
this which not me pleases to Kostas is the humor his
'What I don't like about Kostas is his sense of humor.'

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