De Modo Imperativo

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Lecture Notes

<u>Contents:</u>

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1. *This Course*

What can you get out of this course?

We will be doing three things in parallel:

- We will explore certain basic syntactic and semantic properties of the verbal form called "imperative". So if you are like many others (including me up until a few months ago) that have not really encountered this understudied construction in your linguistic investigations, you will see some cool syntactic and semantic phenomena.

- We will look at three[2] analyses of imperatives and compare them against the empirical phenomena mentioned above.

- We will be embedding our whole discussion within the larger question of how much of the meaning of a construction should be placed in its morphosyntax. It is with an eye on this question that the particular empirical focus and the particular three analyses have been chosen

You are about to see many properties of imperatives, but there are some things you should know beforehand.

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[1] These lectures are based on a course co-taught with Kai von Fintel at MIT in the Spring of 2008.

[2] These proposals were picked because they discuss both the syntax and semantics of imperatives. We have to limit ourselves to three for reasons of time and space; these proposals do not exhaust the literature on imperatives.

2. *Some Very Basic Background*

2.1 Interpretational Variability

When we hear the term "imperative", we think of the form that is associated with commands:

(1) a. Make your bed!
     b. Do your homework!

However, we know that the imperative form does not appear just in commands. Here are *some* of the other interpretive possibilities:

Permission:

(2) A: May I open the window
     B: Yeah, open it.

(3) It starts at 8pm but come earlier, if you like   (Schwager 2006)

Instructions of various sorts:

(4) A: How can I get to Ashfield?
     B: Take Route 2

(5) Peel the eggplants. Cut them into small pieces. Throw them in the soup.

Dares/ Threats (Han 2000) / Concessives (Schwager)

(6) Go on. Throw the rock. I dare you.   (Han 2000)
(7) Alright. Don't come then   (Schwager 2006)

Wishes:

(8)Have a good time!

So while the imperative form is not just used for commands, there are at the same time, ways other than the imperative form to express a command:

- main clauses with "imperative intonation":

(8) a. You are going to be quiet right now[3]
     b. This nonsense will stop right now

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[3] Bennis 2007

- Infinitival imperatives (e.g. Dutch, den Dikken 1992, Bennis 2007; Spanish, Mascaro p.c.) [and for all we know English has this too]:

(9) a. ophoepelen jullie!
Away-go. Inf you.plu
'You go away!'

b. neerleggen   die bal!
down-put.INF that ball
'Put down that ball!'

c. comerlo todo!
Eat it all

- participial imperatives (Rooryck and Postma 2007)

(10)   a. opgehoepeld jullie!
Away-gone.PART jullie
'You go away!'

b. opgepast!
Take-care-PART
'Be careful!'

In fact, look at Ducth, which has all three:

(11)   a. Pas op!
b. Op passen!
c. Opgepast!

- Subjunctive. This is often an option but also often a necessity for cases where the imperative form cannot appear, like in negative imperatives (a lot more on this later)

(12) Na to fas olo! (Greek)
NA it eat all
"eat it all!"

So, as we investigate the question of how to represent the morphosyntax of the imperative and what aspects of its meaning are encoded in it, we should keep in mind that not all imperatives are commands and that not all commands are imperatives.

2.2 Imperative Subjects

Vocative Case (the Case on the addressee of a sentence), is often studied in conjunction with imperatives:

(13) Fred, make your bed!

But there is no good reason for this really. Vocatives appear with all sorts of sentences:

(14) a. Fred, did you know that Romney withdrew this week?
     b. Susan, the books about Nixon are on the top shelf.
     c. Hey everybody, Romney just withdrew from the race.

However, sometimes we see in the left periphery of an imperative clause a DP that cannot possibly be a vocative as it cannot be an addressee.

(15) *Nobody, Romney withdrew from the race
(16) Nobody move!

(17) *Hey, you and Fred, did noone say to stay out of the construction zone?
(18) You and Fred stay out of the construction zone! (Potsdam)

Moreover, these NPs cannot appear sentence-finally, unlike the vocatives:

(19) *Move, Nobody!
(20) John is sick, Fred.

In addition, in languages that make this distinction overtly there are DPs that appear in the Nominative, and not in the Vocative.

Once such conflicting properties were realized, it was argued that there are two types of DPs that we should be careful not to confuse when we look at imperatives: the addressee, which appears in the vocative, and something else.

What is this something else?
Beukema and Coopmans 1989 say it's a special type of NP or position[4]. The main reason is that there are restrictions on what type of NPs can appear in the non-vocative position. Normal subjects have no such restrictions.

However, Potsdam 1998 seems to have convinced the field that these non-vocative DPs are, in fact, subjects. Potsdam does this by taking McCloskey's 1997 list of properties of subjects and arguing that non-vocative DPs have these properties as well (Potsdam 187):

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[4] Platzack and Rozengren 94 say this too, although with different argument than B and C.

(21)
1) Characteristic bearer of certain kinds of semantic roles, prototypically AGENT
2) More prominent than other arguments
        -controls PRO in complements and adjuncts
        -may bind reflexive and reciprocal pronouns in other argument positions but may not itself be bound by these arguments
        -takes wider scope than an element in any other position
        -may license NPIs in another argument position but cannot itself be licensed by an appropriate element in one of these positions
3) typically formally marked, positionally and/or morphologically
4) overwhelmingly required in most situations
5) almost always nominal
6) derived by grammatical operations
  a. Passive
  b. Subject to Subject Raising
  c. Unaccusative Advancement
  d. *Tough* Movement
  e. Floating Quantifiers

What types of D/NPs can be imperative subjects?
Here is a (non-exhaustive) list from Rupp 2003 (55-91), inspired by and mostly taken from Potsdam:

(22) Nobody/Everybody move!   (Quantifiers)
(23) Someone pick up the phone, please, before it drives me mad!   (Indefinites)
(24) The boy in the corner stand up!   (Definites)
(25) People interested in the project come and see me afterwards!   (Bare Plurals)
(26) Chris stand by the door and Shirley watch the window!   (Names)

There is a famous generalization about imperative subjects due to Downing 1969:

(27) The imperative subject must be a subset of addressee.

Potsdam is one of the few that has taken issue with Downing's generalization. He gives some examples of non-addressee subjects:

(28)   a.YOUR soldiers build the bridge, General Lee!
     b.These children of yours keep out of my garden, or I'll set the dog on them!

Potsdam says that there is a relationship between the imperative subject and the addressee, but it's not the subset relation. Instead it is this:

(29) The addressee must be in a control relationship over the referent of the imperative subject

(30) Control Relationship (Potsdam p. 210):

x is in a control relationship with y if x has potential control over y in some domain z (where z may range over social, military, political, economic, discourse, or other situations)

Compare the following sentences. The second one, where the CONTROL relationship is made explicit, is better:

(31) #You in the red chair, everyone get ready to leave!
(32)   Counselors, everyone be packed up and ready to go in half an hour

In summary, imperatives are taken to have subjects[5]. Despite the fact that we don't know the exact nature of the relationship between this subject and the addressee, we do know that there is one. Many researchers take Downing's generalization (27) as a given. This problem is often given a brute force solution in the syntax by the postulation of a functional projection specified as 2nd person that is obligatorily part of the imperative make-up.

So how can we tell whether a DP in the left-periphery of an imperative is a subject or a vocative addressee? The following are some of the differences/diagnostics that have been reported in the literature. However, many more exist. For more, see the work of Davies, Potsdam, Jensen, Zanuttini.

A. the vocative has a special intonational contour, usually including a
        prosodic boundary between the vocative DP and the imperative clause[6].

B. Vocative Case on the vocative DP; Nominative Case on the subject (when this can be seen overtly)

C. The vocative can bind 2nd person pronouns. The subject can bind 2nd or 3rd person

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[5] Zhang 1990 contains a table with the possibilities for a subject in the imperative:
Subjects impossible: Warlpiri, French, Spanish, Italian, Hindi
Subjects possible: English, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, Russian, Lithuanian
(We should note, though, that some Ls that cannot have overt subjects in the imperative, can have overt subjects in the imperative uses of the subjunctive.)
What this larger variation is due to, nobody seems to know yet (though see Jensen for Scandinavian).

[6] Though this is disputed by Russell 2007

pronouns. Nobody disputes this terribly interesting diagnostic, though it has proven very difficult to truly explain the options in (34, 35)

(33) a. Make yourself at home, everybody!
     b. *Make himself at home, everybody!

(34) a. Nobody touch his pen yet!
     b. Nobody touch your pen yet!

(35) a. Everyone raise (his /her/their)/your hand!   (Zanuttini)
     b. Someone raise (his /her /their)/your hand!   (Zanuttini)

Of course, an imperative can also be without an overt subject:

(36) Make your bed!

Researchers who have investigated the nature of the EC subject have come to various conclusions:

pro:
Potsdam (1998), Zhang (1990), Henry (1995), Potsdam (1996), Platzack and Rosengren (1997), and also Rooryck (1991), Beukema (1992), and Den Dikken (1992)), Rupp 2003

PRO:
Han (2000), Shutze

Variable:
Beukema and Coopmans

Moreover, some researchers have asked the question of the effects of chosing an overt subject. For this issue see among others Moon 2001 Harvard PhD, Flagg's 2002 MIT PhD.

3. *Three Proposals*

The proposals we will be discussing are Han 2000, Portner 2004/2007, Schwager 2006.

With respect to the larger question of whether there is something in the morpho-syntax of imperatives that determines its meaning, these three proposals can be ranked in terms of the degree of imperative-specific material they postulate in the representation:

Han: an imperative-specific operator with the feature [directive]
Schwager: a performative but underspecified (i.e. not command-specific) universal modal

<u>Portner</u>: nothing imperative specific (other than maybe a functional projection that encodes the restriction for 2nd person)

In Questions, it is common to postulate a Q-operator and/or feature that is responsible for making the sentence a question. In Declaratives, we do not have such an element that makes the sentence an assertion. What is the case with imperatives?

At a Glance:

	Semantics	Syntax
Han	Imperatives contain an illocutionary operator with Directive force	Imperative contains [dir] and [irr] features, situated in C.
Schwager	Imperatives contain a performative modal of universal force.	The imperative modal is in SPEC,CP. There is an +imp feature on C that ensures V-movement
Portner	Imperatives denote addressee-restricted properties. There is a pragmatic operation that interprets such properties as instructions to add items to the addressee's TO DO list.	The only imperative-specific syntax *might* be an operator that forces the imperative subject to be the addressee.

This section contains highlights from the three approaches to imperatives that we will be comparing. These summaries are extremely simplified and should not be used for citation purposes. If you want to refer to any of these ideas, please read the originals.

Remember that these three proposals are not the only ones on imperatives. Only three are chosen here for reasons of space. These proposals differ in how much of the specific meaning of the imperative they place in the syntax/semantics. They are presented in decreasing order of such specialized "imperative" content. This also happens to be close to their chronological order.

3.1 Han 2000

Across languages, in imperatives, there is an Imperative Operator in C^o.

- The imperative operator is a set of features: [directive] and [irrealis].

"The feature [directive] encodes directive illocutionary force, and it is responsible for driving verb movement to C^o either before Spell-Out or at LF, depending on the language. The feature [irrealis] contributes modality of unrealized and it selects/requires either subjunctive or infinitive INFL" (p. 116)

Subjunctives and infinitives have an operator in C^o with just the feature [irrealis].

This subset/affinity relationship between imperatives and subjunctives/infinitivals makes several predictions about the distribution of subjunctives and infinitives with respect to the distribution of imperatives:

A) Subjunctives and infinitives can be used as commands, though some pragmatic inferencing is required. Matrix subjunctives in particular can be used for a variety of purposes, one of them being a command. Matrix infinitives have fewer possibilities than subjunctives, but commands are one of the possibilities:

(1) Na to fas!   (Greek)
      It eat-Subj

(2) Leer!   (Spanish)
      read-Inf

The featural make-up of the three categories captures the fact that the directive force is directly encoded in imperatives, while it is an inference in subjunctives and infinitives. The claim that it is an inference in the latter two is supposed to be supported by the fact that they have readings other than commands. However, imperatives also have readings other than commands, but that variability Han attributes to other components

B) In certain languages, imperatives cannot be negated (a lot more on this later). In the relevant environments, a subjunctive or infinitive appears:

(3) *No lee   lo!   (Spanish)
       Neg read-Imp it

(4)   No   lo leas!
       Neg   it read-Subj
       'Don't read it!'

(5)   No   leer   lo!
       Neg   read-Inf it! 'Don't read it!'

C) Imperatives cannot be embedded[7]. Subjunctives and infinitives are used in indirect speech to report a command:

(6) *J'exige   que tu   finis
       I-require that you finish-Imp

(7) J'exige   que tu   finisses
       I-require that you finish-Subj

What makes an imperative unembeddable is the [directive] feature, which encodes illocutionary force. Subjunctives and infinitives have only [irrealis], and so have no problem being embedded.

- The [directive] feature in C^o attracts the verb (either overtly or covertly). For this reason, imperatives often have the verb in C^o but matrix subjunctives and infinitives do not. This can be seen in word orders relative to a clitic:

(8) Dhiavase to   (Greek)
      read-Imp it
      'Read it'

(9) Na to dhiavasis
      it read-Subj
     'Read it'

- Han also says that the imperative operator *encode*s that it is the speaker that issues the directive and also that it is meant as a directive to the addressee. That is, it is this operator that somehow determines that overt, apparently 3rd person subjects refer to the addressee:

(10) The boy in the corner stand up, will you/*he?
(11) Nobody/Somebody move! I am begging you.

- The feature [directive] encodes "directive illocutionary force[8]", which turns the sentence into a directive action.

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[7] It is a common statement that imperatives cannot be embedded. Reported counterexamples are Korean (see Portner 2004 and references therein, though see Han 2000 for an opposing view on Korean). More recently, Crnic and Trinh 2008 have argued that English also has embedded imperatives (see also fn. 12):

i. He said call him
[8] Han attributes the notion of illocutionary force to Frege.

The directive force turns the sentence into a "speech act". The term "speech act" is in the tradition of Austin 1962, Searle 1969, 1976 and is defined by Han as "the action performed by uttering a sentence" (p. 168)[9].

Declaratives perform the speech act of assertion, interrogatives the speech act of request for information and imperatives the speech act of a directive action.

The speech act "directive action" is an instruction to the addressee to update his/her Plan Set. "A plan set is a set of propositions that specify the hearer's intentions and it represents the state of affairs that the hearer intends to bring about." (p. 165)

- The notion of "plan" presupposes that the addressee can in principle carry it out.
So the speaker uttering the imperative believes that the hearer can carry out the plan.

Even though [directive] is described as a (syntactic) feature, it is also described as taking an argument, namely [irrealis][10]. "Irrealis (*p*): denotes a set of possible worlds in which p is satisfied" (p.167)
The net result of the directive – irrealis combination is that the set of possible worlds is "restricted to future-oriented possible worlds due to the meaning of *directive*" (p.167)

- Overall, Han gives the following reasons for believing that the directive action in imperatives is grammatically encoded rather than pragmatically inferenced:
    o imperatives cannot be embedded shows that they contain an illocutionary force feature. (Recall that subjunctives and infinitives can be embedded because they lack this feature.)
    o there is overt V-movement to C^o in imperatives in many languages. This means that there is a feature attracting the verb in C^o. (as compared to subjunctives and infinitives which lack such movement)
    o Imperatives have a separate morphological form, so there is *some* feature(s) that are particular to them.
    o we can explain why imperatives cannot be negated in many languages.

3.2 Schwager 2006

According to Schwager, an imperative sentence has a covert imperative operator (modal) in [SPEC, CP].

There is also a [+imp] feature that is meant to ensure V-movement, though she does not say much about this movement or the nature of this feature. There can also be a TP that is

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[9] The sentences whose speech act is explicitly described in the matrix are called "performatives": *I declare you husband and wife, I apologize*, etc.
[10] According to Han, it makes sense for [directive] to take [irrealis] as its argument because Plan is a future-oriented action.

marked for present tense, or else, present tense is part of the "interpretation" of the [+imp] feature.

The quantificational force of the imperative modal is universal[11]. Like any modal within the system of Kratzer 1981[12], it has a modal base and an ordering source. The variety of readings that an imperative has are the result of different choices of the ordering source[13]. The modal base of the imperative modal is what the hearer and speaker both consider to be possible future courses of events (a "conversational background of mutual joint belief").

Part of the machinery that the imperative comes with for Schwager ensures that the imperative subject is a subset of the addressee. She says the reason this cannot be left to the pragmatics of use is for a reason that Schmerling 1982 pointed out: other sentences that have the same usage do not have this property:

(12) Fix the typewriter!
(13) The typewriter has to be fixed.
(14) Somebody has to fix the type writer

Only (12) requires that the addressee be the one responsible for getting the writer fixed.

In short, for Schwager, the following two sentences can be equivalent:

(15) You should leave!
(16) Leave!

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[11] She says that covert modals are typically universal, though we do not know why. The position that the imperative modal is universal is maintained throughout the thesis until the last chapter, which is entitled "Afterthoughts". There she speculates on the possibility that the quantificational force of the modal might be existential but that it is in the scope of an exhaustive operator, with the result that the two together can have the result of necessity. This proposal is not developed in the same degree as the one that the modal is universal, so I will not discuss it here. For a bit more, see the section on permissions.

[12] We do not have time here to give the necessary background for this framework. For a good overview, you may want to read the class notes on this topic by my colleagues Kai von Fintel and Irene Heim, which you can find by navigating through here:
http://kaivonfintel.org/teaching
or go directly here:
https://stellar.mit.edu/S/course/24/sp07/24.973/courseMaterial/topics/topic1/lectureNotes/intensionalsemantics/intensionalsemantics.pdf

[13] That is, in the COMMAND reading of an imperative (*Get up!),* the ordering source is the speaker's commands; in the WISH reading (*Get well!*) the ordering source is the speaker's desires. For the permission reading, see later section.

Like all modal verbs, the imperative modal has certain restrictions on the conversational backgrounds or ordering sources with which it is compatible. For example, both *muessen* and the imperative modal are necessity modals, but only the former can describe dispositions:

(17) You must sneeze
(18) Sneeze!

(17) can describe the addressee's disposition to sneeze but (18) cannot.

Another relevant example is German *duerfen*, which is only compatible with teleological, deontic or volitional conversational backgrounds.

Moreover, modals often differ in what sort of ordering sources they require or permit. According to Schwager, German *sollen* and *muessen* are both necessity modals, but only *muessen* can go with an empty ordering source. The imperative modal can never go with an empty ordering source (it has to come with a "preference-related" ordering source (deontic or bouletic but not stereotypical, circumstantial or doxastic)).

So far, then, the imperative modal does not seem to have any type of restriction that other (overt) modals lack.

However, at least one obvious objection can be raised in this assimilation of the imperative modal to other necessity modals, as Schwager herself points out. An imperative like (16) cannot be used descriptively (i.e. report the existence of an obligation) but (15) can.

In other words, we can assign truth-conditions to (15) but not to (16) which is not predicted if the imperative is just a necessity modal. So what is going on?

Overt modals have descriptive and non-descriptive, or "performative", uses. When uttering a sentence with a descriptive modal, the speaker is making an assertion that the subject has, for example, a certain obligation.

(19) John has to take out the garbage.
        (Because his mother has imposed this rule.)

When uttering a sentence with a performative modal, the speaker is *making* the subject have an obligation:

(20) Now, John has to take out the garbage.
        (I am hereby imposing this obligation on him)

The same holds for modals of existential force:

(21)   John may go to the movies.
          (His mother allows him to do so.)

(22)   Now, John may go to the movies.
          (I am hereby permitting him as he has finished his homework)

What determines whether a modal is used descriptively or as a performative? Certain presuppositions on the context of use, specifically the following three:

– The Authority Condition: "…either the social status of the speaker with respect to the hearer allows him to issue an imperative that is meant to guide the actions of the latter, or, the speaker possesses some rational authority with respect to an issue that he is authorized to give advice on the matter" (p. 157; inspired by Hamblin 1967).

– Epistemic Uncertainty Condition: The speaker should consider both **p** and ~**p** to be possible.
In this, the imperative modal differs from other (overt) modals, which can be uttered when the speaker knows that **p** is going to, or when the speaker knows that **p** is not going to happen ((23) and (24) are Schwager's, though she gives the German equivalents; these are her translations):

(23)   I know that you are going to do it, and moreover you have to.
(24)   #Do it! But I know you will not.

(25)   You have to do it but I know you will not
(26)   #I know that you are going to do it (anyway), so do it! [14]
.
– Ordering Source Affirmation: "the speaker affirms the ordering source. (Therefore, he considers it to be better (sometimes with respect to a contextually salient goal) that the proposition modalized by the imperative operator come out true" (p. 169)

The imperative modal differs from overt modals in this:

(27)   You have to leave, but I don't want you to leave
(28)   #Leave! But I don't want you to leave.

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[14] Example (26) is actually fine when it is reinterpreted as "… so do it *now*". The obligatoriness of this reinterpretation supports the Epistemic Uncertainty Condition. Example (23) is original to Schwager, examples (24-26) are not. Instead of (26) she had the following (verbatim):
      i.   #I know that you are at any way going to do it, so do it also
However, (i) is ill-formed as a sentence of English.

According to Schwager, this condition is why "uttering imperatives induces a strong pressure on the addressee to act upon them, or, why imperatives are felt to be …'uncomfortable' as Wratil (2004) chooses to put it."

An imperative sentence contains a modal that comes with these presuppositions. In other words, if these conditions are not met, an overt modal is used descriptively, but an imperative is undefined (suffers from presupposition failure).

According to Schwager, the above three presuppositional requirements on the context put together (in addition to the requirement that the ordering source be preference-related, i.e. not empty) make up what we call "performativity" of the imperative modal.

Schwager does not discuss Han's proposal specifically but she does discuss the general idea of encoding imperatives as speech acts (she discusses Krifka's proposal as an example of this type).
Her main point of criticism is the following:
- An imperative sentence can be used in too many types of speech acts (command, permission, wish, advice etc). Therefore, one would be forced to say either that the speech act associated with an imperative is extremely underspecified, or, that it is many ways ambiguous. Neither option seems desirable, especially given the crosslinguistic stability of the existence of the several usages of imperatives.

3.3 Portner 2004, 2007

Portner's account should be seen with the backdrop of the following working hypothesis:

Force is not represented in the syntax or the semantics. Compositional interpretation yields objects like propositions, properties, etc. What he calls "sentential force" is determined indirectly.

Universally, there are three discourse components, each of which represents a sentential force. Moreover, there are Types of Clauses. The type of a clause determines which discourse component the sentence belongs/contributes to. That is, there is a one-to-one mapping between discourse components and clause types.

<u>The three discourse components</u>:

The "Common Ground": a set of propositions representing information that is presupposed to be true by all participants in a conversation (Stalnaker 1975).

The "Question Set": set of questions that participants agree to try to answer in the course of the conversation (Ginzburg 1995, Roberts 1996).

The To-Do List[15]: set of properties.

<u>Each of these discourse components has an update function</u>:

Declaratives contribute to the Common Ground (and only to the Common Ground)
Interrogatives contribute to the Question Set   (and only to the Question Set)
Imperatives contribute to a To-Do List (and only to the To-Do List)

Every sentence must contribute its contents to one of the discourse components.

For example, a declarative denotes a proposition. The sentential force associated with declaratives is "Assertion", namely the addition of the proposition to the Common Ground.
Declaratives can only contribute to the Common Ground (and not some other discourse component) because of their nature/type. There is no syntactic element/operator that says "Add me to the Common Ground". Thus, every sentence that denotes a proposition contributes to the Common Ground, and since declaratives can only denote propositions, they always go to the Common Ground.

An interrogative denotes a set of propositions (Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977). The sentential force of an interrogative is "Asking", namely the addition to the Question Set of the set of propositions denoted by the interrogative. An interrogative can only contribute to the Question Set, and that is because of its Clause Type and of the type of semantic object it denotes, i.e., the set of propositions. There is no operator that says "Add me to the Question Set".

Similarly, imperatives can only contribute to the To-Do list because of their nature/type. There is no syntactic operator that says "Add me to the To-Do list". <u>So there is no operator, modal or feature with the content "imperative" or "directive".</u>

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[15] *Common Ground* and *Question Sets* are shared by the participants of a conversation. On the other hand, *To-Do Lists* belong to individual participants. "What is shared among participants in a conversation is a To-Do List Function, a function which assigns a To-Do List to each participant" (Portner 2004, p.3.)

The denotation of an imperative is a property. The sentential Force of imperatives is "Requiring", which is the addition of the property denoted by the imperative to some To-Do List. (Obviously, it is not to just anybody's To-Do List that the property gets added to but the addressee's; we will return shortly to Portner's views on this). Intuitively, a To-Do list is a list of actions the addressee should take.

As a summary, here is Portner 2004's Table 1:

Type	Denotation	Discourse Component	Force
Declaratives	Proposition (p)	Common Ground= Set of propositions	Assertion $CG \cup \{p\}$
Interrogatives	Set of propositions (q)	Question Set= Set of sets of propositions	Asking $QS \cup \{q\}$
Imperatives	Property (P)	To-Do List Function= Function from individuals to sets of properties	Requiring$_A$[16] $TDL(A) \cup \{P\}$

So how exactly does it work for Imperatives?

An Imperative is a property. For example, *Leave!* denotes the property of leaving. Why is the property added to the To-Do List? As far as I can tell, this happens by elimination. It cannot be added to the Common Ground or the Question Set because it is of the wrong Clause Type: The Common Ground only "accepts" propositions and the Question Set only "accepts" sets of propositions. The only remaining possibility is the third discourse component, the To-Do List[17].

So a To-Do List is a set of properties.

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[16] A is the addressee of the imperative.

[17] This is Portner's 2004 "general principles" approach. In 2007, he has as a parallel alternative that imperatives are explicitly stated as contributing to the To-Do List. But in 2007 he also considers the choice between these two alternatives insignificant (2007, p.8)

Why does an imperative contribute to the *addressee's* To-Do List?

The imperative subject saturates the argument structure of the imperative verb. The result is a proposition. The imperative subject is a logophoric pronoun, which means for Portner that it is bound by an operator. This higher operator converts the proposition into a property by abstracting over the subject argument. The operator adds the content "is the addressee" to whatever the imperative subject is.

When the imperative subject is null or *you*, nothing more needs to be said. The null subject or *you* is a logophoric pronoun or variable that gets abstracted over by the operator ultimately, and the result for (29) is (30):

(29) (You) be quiet!
(30) [λw . λx : x = addressee . x is quiet]

Things are more complicated with overt subjects like proper names or QPs. The Universal Quantifier ranges over all elements that belong to the addressee:

(31) Everyone sit down!
(32) [λw . λx : x = addressee . [∀y : y∈x . y sits down]]

Portner also points out that focus evidently achieves the same goal: "contrastive focus somehow provides a variable for the operator to bind" (Portner 2004, p. 10).

(33) JOHN stand HERE and MARY stand THERE!
(34) [λw. λx : x = addressee. John∈x & John stands here & Mary∈x & Mary stands there]

This means that the imperative subject is unique among subjects in that it must be a variable or be associated with a variable.

Portner also speculates that the operator that binds the logophoric pronoun in subject position might be the element that triggers the commonly found V-movement in imperatives.

The fact that the imperative adds a property to the *addressee'*s To-Do List (and not somebody else's) is given as a domain restriction (presupposition) of the imperative. Portner speculates that this may be syntactically encoded in a functional projection, by citing work by Zanuttini and others. However, one could apply against this position the form of an argument that Portner himself applies against the "modal" account of imperatives: this FP would have such unique properties that one could just as well say that addressee restriction is just a property of the imperative and that representing this property as a functional projection is superfluous.

There is a variety of To-Do Lists (or sections of a To-Do List), just like there is a variety of ordering sources for modals (Portner 2007: p. 9,10):

(35) Noah should sit down right now, given that he's been ordered to do so
        (deontic ordering source)
(36) Noah should have a piece of fruit, given that it would make him happy
        (bouletic ordering source)
(37) Noah should talk to his advisor more often, given that he wants to finish his degree.
        (teleological ordering source)

(38) Sit down right now!   (goes to that (section of the) To-Do list that represents orders)
(39) Have a piece of fruit! (goes to that (section of the) To-Do list that represents desires)
(40) Talk to your advisor more often!   (goes to that (section of the) To-Do list that represents goals)

An important difference, though, is that "The difference is that the modal (35) says that sitting down follows from the rules, while (38) says that sitting down should be one of the rules" (Portner 2007, p.8).

Even though Portner points to parallels between imperatives and modals, the two have different semantics for him. In fact, he is quite critical of what he calls the "modal" accounts of imperatives.

Portner discusses both Han and Schwager, who he places both in what he calls the "modal" camp because of their imperative semantics.
Basically, the punchline of his argument is going to be this: the modal accounts of the imperative have a modal with such idiosyncratic properties that one doesn't gain anything by saying it's a modal. Moreover, it appears that even within the modal accounts, it is not possible to do without a notion like a To-Do List and some sort of update function of this. So one can just as well say that these notions belong to the imperative as such, without saying that they belong to some kind of strange modal, which in turn belongs to the imperative.

More specifically:

A garden variety modal sentence has truth conditions, even when it is restricted to the addressee:

(41)   A: You have to take out the garbage every day.
       B: That's not true / That's true

(42)   A: John thinks you have to take the garbage out every day
       B: What he thinks is true / false

In other words, (deontically) modalized declaratives, as all declaratives, contribute to the Common Ground.

On the other hand, Imperatives do not have truth conditions:

(43) A: Take out the garbage!
(44) B: #That's true / #That's not true

For Schwager, imperatives have a special element, a covert performative modal. Performative modals differ from non-performative modals in that by uttering them, the speaker *bestows* an obligation (on the addressee). In other terms, a performative modal contributes to the addressee's *Plan Set* or *To Do List*. On the other hand, non-performative modals *report* an obligation (and that is why they form declarative sentences, with truth-conditions).

Supposedly, there are also overt performative modals. For example, Ninan 2005 claims that English *must*, when it is unembedded, has performative uses, which for Ninan meant adding the argument of *must* to the addressee's To-Do List, following Portner 2004. Ninan bases this on contrasts like the following (judgments his):

(45) #Sam must go to confession, but he is not going to
(46) #You must go to confession, but you're not going to
(47) #I must go to confession, but I'm not going to

(48) Sam should/has to go to confession, but he is not going to
(49) You should/has to go to confession, but you're not going to
(50) I should/has to go to confession, but I'm not going to

Ninan's idea is that the status of (45-47) as opposed to (48-50) is due to the fact that one cannot bestow an obligation if at the same time one asserts that it will not be fulfilled Ninan claims, in other words, that the status of (45-47) is akin to that of the following sentences[18]:

(51) #Go to confession! You're not going to go to confession.

In other words, for Ninan (and Portner accepts this argument), when *must* is unembedded, it necessarily functions as a performative modal. However, *must* also has non-performative uses, which can be seen when it is embedded:

(52) A: John thinks Sam must go to confession
        B: That's true. John is right

(53) Since John must go to confession, he should find a church soon.

A further argument of Ninan's position that unembedded *must* is a performative modal is the contrast in available readings for combinations of deontic modals with past obligations:

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[18] My own judgment is that (51) is much worse than (45-47).

(54)   Sam should/ought to have gone to confession.   (deontic reading ok)
(55)   Sam must have gone to confession   (only epistemic reading)

Ninan explains this pattern by saying that because unembedded *must* is only a performative modal, and because one cannot bestow obligations in the past, the sentence fails to have any deontic reading[19].

Portner: What we see is that the performative (unembedded) function of the modal does not reduce to the non-performative (embedded) function of the modal. That is, we cannot do without notions like *bestowing an obligation*, a *To-Do List* or *Plan Set* or something like that. Looking at the imperative, we would have to say that its modal is *only* performative, since we cannot force an imperative to have a non-performative reading[20]. We have no overt counterpart of this, that is, we have no overt modal that can *only* be performative.

He says:
"A modal which only had a performative use might as well not be called a modal at all. The performative aspect of its meaning, modeled as the addition of its prejacent to the To-Do List or in some other way, would explain everything that needs to be explained about its meaning. In addition, there are no overt modals whose sole function is to update the To-Do List (even *must* has modal truth conditions as well… For these reasons, we're better off simply saying that an imperative's only role is to add to the To-Do List" (p. 11)

In short, the properties that one would need to ascribe to the imperative modal are so unique, and they would make the modal in the imperative so unlike any other modal, that you are just as well off saying that these are just the properties of the imperative.

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[19] Though if embedded *must* is non-performative, shouldn't the following permit a deontic reading for the embedded clause?

  i.   John thinks that Sam must have gone to confession

I don't think that it does. Maybe the scopal relation between *must* and Past plays a role as well.

[20] Part of the argument here relies on the presumed unembeddability of imperatives. However, in the newly discovered English embedded imperatives (Crnic and Trinh 2008), the embedded imperative does not obtain a truth-conditional status (note the absence of "to" in A's utterance). B's utterance in (i) can only be predicated of the matrix clause but in (ii) it can be predicated of the matrix or the embedded clause

  i.   A: John said call him at home
           B: That's true
  ii.   A: John said that Mary has arrived
           B: That's not true

4. *The phenomena we will be focusing on*

4.1 *Negative Imperatives and lack thereof*

Unexpected effects occur when we try to place negation in an imperative sentence.

For one, there are languages where an imperative verb cannot be negated. In these languages, a different verb form appears for negative commands. As far as one can tell from the literature, this is sometimes the subjunctive and sometime the infinitive[21]. Here are some Greek, Spanish, and Italian examples:

(1)a. fiye!
   Leave! (imperative form)

   b. *dhen/mi fiye
        NEG   leave.imp

   c.   min[22] fijis
        NEG leave

(2)a. Lee!
   Read!-imp

   b. *No lee

   c. No leas!
      Neg read.subj

(3)a. Mangia!
   Eat! Imp

---

[21] For many, if not all of these languages, it is not the case that the subjunctive requires negation to be used as commands. These verbal forms can also be used as commands in affirmative sentences. So it is not the case that in languages without TNIs, under negation, the imperative gets "transformed" into a subjunctive. However in some cases an extra element is needed in affirmative sentences:
i. Que leas! Read.Subj! Spanish
ii. Na fiyis! Leave.Subj! Greek

[22] The negation 'dhen' is only for indicative sentences.

b. *Non mangia!

c.   Non mangiare!
        Not eat! Inf

But of course there are also well-behaved Ls like Dutch:

(4) Eet dat!
     Eat that!

(5) Eet dat niet!
     Eat that NEG!
     'Don't eat that!'

Following the terminology of Zanuttini 1994, we will call the well-behaved ones "True Negative Imperatives" or TNIs. Examples like those in Greek are called "Surrogate Negative Imperatives" or SNIs.

Here is, according to Zeijlstra 2006, the crosslinguistic picture—though, the picture for particular languages are not original to his work[23]:

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[23] A note on Hungarian in this chart: Zeijlstra reports Hungarian as lacking TNIs. However, what appears to be the case (and Zeijlstra himself notes this later in the paper) is that the verb stays in the imperative, but the form of the negation is imperative-specific. In declaratives, we get "nem", in imperatives "ne":

i. nem evett torta'-t
        not ate cake-acc
        'he didn't eat cake'

ii. ne edd meg a torta'-t
        not eat-imp,2sg perfective the cake-acc
        'you(sg) don't eat the cake!'

Table 1

Language	TNI
Spanish	*
Italian	*
Portuguese	*
Czech	√
Polish	√
Bulgarian	√
Serbo-Croatian	√
Standard French	√
Greek	*
Romanian	*
Hebrew	*
Hungarian	*
Dutch	√
German	√
Norwegian	√
Swedish	√
Bavarian	√
Yiddish	√
Quebecois	√

Looking at table 1, one might get the impression that the absence of TNIs happens in just some languages (7 don't have them; 12 have them) and we have to find out why. We get a somewhat different picture than table 1 if we look at the typological literature. Van der Auwera 2008 reports that van der Auwera and Lejeune 2005 looked at 495 languages. Only 113 of these have TNIs and that is a markedly small subset.

4.1.a Rivero and Terzi 1995

There are two Classes of Ls.

Class I: Imperative Verbs have a distinctive syntax: MGreek, Spanish
Class II: Imperative Verbs lack a distinctive syntax: AGreek, Serbo-Croatian

Class I: C hosts a logical mood (strong) feature for imperatives,
        Imperative verb must move to C to check relevant feature

Class II: C hosts no mood features.
        Mood features in INFL
        Imperative verb doesn't move out of infl area to check imperative feature
        C-area hosts Wackernagel clitics

Verb may move to C to provide last-resort support for 2P clitics, what they call the "W-function" (this is enlightened self-interest as opposed to greed)

The loss of Wackernagel-effects in Greek was a crucial factor for the subsequent development of the special syntax of Imperatives.

R&T expanded:

In Class I, the verb *always* precedes the clitics, unlike in declaratives, as we saw earlier. This means that the verb moves to C. TNIs are blocked because of the HMC/ECP: the verb cannot move over negation, which is a head.
You might ask: how come the verb can skip over the clitic, leaving it thereby behind, but it cannot skip over negation?
R&T's answer: Because clitics and Neg are different types of heads. Neg can be modified by adverbs, stand on its own, and be stressed. Clitics cannot.

(6)   a. O Yiannis shedon den efage.   MGk
           the John   almost Neg eat.PAST.3S

       b. Juan casi no comió.   Sp
           John almost Neg eat.PAST.3S
           'John almost didn't eat.'

(7)   a. Mi!
       b. No!

(8)   a. Aftos DEN tha figi.
          He   Neg FUT leave.PRES.3S
          'He will not leave.'

          b. Juan NO viene.
          John Neg come.PRES.3S
          'John will not come.'

But RT take the biggest difference to be that Neg has "operator features". The verb with Mood does too. The clitics don't. Hence we have a Relativized Minimality effect (see Roberts 1992 for classifying heads along A and A-bar lines). Therefore, the verb can skip over the clitics on its way to C but not over the negation head.

Class II:
Serbo-Croatian and AGreek.

Serbo-Croatian:

Has TNIs:

(9)   a. Citajte!
        read.IMP.2P!
       'You (P) read!'

       b. Ne citajte!
        Neg read.IMP.2P!
        'Do not read!'

Verb follows clitics except when the verb is in first position. There is no imperative versus non-imperative distinction when it comes to verb-clitic order:

(10)   a. Citajte   je!
          read.IMP.2P it !
         'You (P) read it!'

       b. Citate   je.
        Read.PRES.2P it
        'You (P) are reading it.'

(11) a. Knjige im   citajte!
         Books to.them read.IMP.2P
         'You (P) read books to them!'

       b.   Lica im   razaznaje.
          Faces to.them   distinguish.PRES.3S
          'He distinguishes their faces.'

The verb and negation go together in imperatives, and there also, they follow the clitics when something else is in 1st position, but precede the clitics when they are in first position:

(12) a. Ne   citajte   je!
        Neg read.IMP.2P   it!
        'Do not read it!'

       b. Ne   citate   je.
           Neg read.PRES.2P   it
           'You are not reading it.'

(13) a. Knjige im   ne citajte!
         books to.them Neg read.IMP.2P
         'Do not read books to them!'

b. Lica   im   ne   razaznaje.
faces to.them   Neg distinguish.PRES.3S
'He does not distinguish their faces.' (Radanovic-Kocic 1988: 107)

So the V in C does not check features because then these would remain unchecked in the last 2 cases. Instead, it provides last resort support for 2P clitics.

Ancient Greek:

Has TNIs:

(14) Mê   mega   lege.   Plato, Phaedo 95b
    Neg grandly say.IMP.2S
    'Do not boast so.'

As in S-C, the imperative verb can either precede or follow a 2P item, i.e. the verb-2P item order is not dependent on mood, just as in SC

(15) a.   Patakson   **men**, akouson   de.
              strike.IMP.2S P   listen.IMP.2S P
              Plutarch, Themistocles 11.3.6
              'By all means strike, but listen.'

      b.   Ta   **men** poiei,   ta   de mê poiei.   Plato, Protagoras 325d
              these P do.IMP.2S, these P neg do.IMP.2S
              'Do this, but do not do that.'

As before, RT show that the V is in C only for a W-function. The same can be shown for other moods:

(16) a.   Eboulomên   men ouk erizein   enthade.
              wish.IND.1S P   Neg contend.INF here
          Aristophanes, Ranae 866
              'And I wish(ed) I was not contending here (as I am).'

      b. Ego men ouk oida.   Xenophon, Cyropaedia 1.4.12
        I   P neg know.IND.1S
        'I, for my part, do not know.'

(17) a.   Hupolabêi   de mêdeis.   Thucydides 6. 84
              suppose.SUBJ.3S P   no.one
              'And let no one suppose.'

b. Hêmeis de   prosmenômen ;   Sophocles, Trachiniae 390
   we   P   wait.SUBJ.1P ?
   'And shall we wait?'

(18) a. Gnoiês   d'   an   hoti touth'houtôs exei.
      know.OPT.2S   P   that this so   has.IND.3S
       Xenophon, Cyropaedia 1.6.21
      'You may see that this is so.'

    b. Epeita   de kai ti   pathoimi.   Homer, Odyssey phi 274
       Thereupon P also something suffer.OPT.1S
       'After that, may I suffer anything.'

More or less, the story in AGreek is the same as in SC.

One difference between AG and SC has to do with negation: in SC it can incorporate the verb and move with it to C when there is a need to support 2P items. Not so in AG. In fact, in this L, negation and verb do not even have to be adjacent:

(19)   **Ouk** epi   tên ekeinou **pleusometha**;   Demosthenes 4.44
        Neg against the his   set.sail.IND.1P
        'Shall we not set sail against his country?'

(20)   **Me**   agroikoteron êi   to   alêthes **eipein**.
         Neg   too+rude   is.SUBJ.3S   the truth tell.INF
         Plato, Gorgias 462e
       'I suspect it is too rude to tell the truth.'

But this negation does not create problems for when the verb moves to a position in INFL to check its imp feature because that position is lower than neg.

Criticism of RT by Han 2001:

-in Class I Ls, the verb and negation behave as one unit. So why couldn't the verb just take the clitic along on its way to C, the way it does in other constructions (eg AuX-to-COMP in Italian,)

Criticism of RT by Zeijlstra 2004:

-first point same as Han's
-second point: in Class I Ls, the imperative verb /the illocutionary force operator ends up lower than neg, which is prohibited (following Han 2001).

4.1.b Han 2001

Han (2001) in a nutshell: Imperatives have an illocutionary force operator OP. Illocutionary force operators cannot be negated (Frege and others). In some Ls, the syntax of clause structure is such that OP would end up c-commanded by negation. Those Ls have to resort to a different way of expressing negative commands. In other Ls, it is possible to have sentential negation without OP ending up under it. Those Ls have TNIs.

That the negation is always interpreted inside and not outside the scope of whatever gives the directive force in the imperative is shown as follows:

(21) Don't call!   (Han: 307)
        =I require that you not call
  =/= I do not require that you call

And this point is supposed to hold for any illocutionary force: negative questions and negated declaratives are not non-questions or non-declaratives[24].

Now let's expand on Han.

We need to show that OP is in C and that the verb must move to it (from Rivero 1994 and Rivero & Terzi 1995). Here are the arguments Han uses.

German:

The imperative verb precedes the subject in German.

(22) Shreib du den Aufsatz!
   Write you the paper!

(23) *Du shreib den Aufsatz!

This order does not strictly speaking show that the verb is in C, of course. We need something more. Den Besten 1989 pointed out that weak pronouns appear either after the complementizer or after the subject:

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[24] Actually, since Han has permission and command ultimately coming from the same directive force operator, she also predicts that negated imperatives should have the permission>negation reading. This seems correct:
A: I don't want to read this book
B: don't read it then.
Though if one permitted the Neg>permission reading of the directive force operator, one would get the meaning of a negated imperative.

(24) ..dass (WP) Subject (WP) ….

In yes/no questions, where the complementizer is missing and the first verb is fronted, the weak pronoun appears either after the fronted verb or after the subject:

(25)   V (WP) Subject (WP)….

From this, den Besten had concluded that the fronted verb is in C in yes/no questions. Han points out that the same test carries over to imperatives:

(26) Schreib es du heute!
   Write it   you today

(27) Schreib du es heute!

Hence, the V in imperatives is where it is in yes/no questions, namely in C.

French, Italian, Spanish and Greek (argument from Rivero 1994 and Rivero &Terzi 1995):

Clitics, which are preverbal in declaratives, must be postverbal in imperatives (preverbal placements are out in the following):

(28) Faites –le! French
   Do it!

(29) Dhiavase to![25]   Greek (Rivero and Terzi)

(30) Lee lo!   Spanish (Rivero and Terzi)

(31) Telefonale!   Italian

Italian (argument from Zanuttini 1997)

The adverbial *di sicuro* ("definitely") can be shown to appear high in the sentence. In imperatives, the verb must precede it, the opposite order is not possible:

(32) Fallo di sicuro
   Do it definitely!

Also, Zanuttini showed that the adverbs *pur* and *ben*, both meaning "indeed", can appear before the subject and after the verb in the famous AUX-to-COMP cases I Italian:

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[25] In fact, in Geek, in postverbal position clitics can be freely ordered, unlike I preverbal position. See Terzi for an explanation.

(33) Avesse pu/ben Gianni capito il problema, …
    Having indeed Gianni understood the problem
        "Even if Gianni had understood the problem, …"

Zanuttini also shows that these adverbs appear before the subject and after the verb in imperatives:

(34) Dagli ben una risposta!
    Give-him indeed an answer!

So the imperative verb and the verb in AUX-to-COMP are in the same place. If the latter is in C, so is the former.

So, V is in C in imperatives in several Ls. This must be because something in C attracts the verb there. This is the illocutionary force operator. And for Han 308: "This in effect means that the [Imp] feature on the verb <u>assumes</u> the role of the imperative operator as it moves to C" [emphasis SI]

In Ls with no TNIs, negation is a clitic that gets carried with a verb to C. Because of this and because the verb "assumed" the role of the imperative operator, the latter ends up in the scope of negation, which is not permitted:

(35)

```
            CP
             |
            C'
          /    \
        C        IP
        |
        I
       / \
     Neg   I
           |
        V [Imp]
```

On the other hand, Ls that have TNIs have a negation that stays low in the tree and therefore the movement to C of the verb does not bring the operator in the scope of negation.
(You might think that French should behave like Italian, etc, but remember that the negation in French is taken to be *pas* and not *ne*)

And what about English *don't* imperatives? Han takes the head of *don' t* to be *n't* (following assumptions by Kayne, Zanuttini, Baltin):

(36)

```
                    CP
                     |
                     C'
                    / \
                   C   IP
                   |
                  Neg
                  / \
            do [Imp]  Neg
                       |
                      n't
```

Above, it is do[Imp] that c-commands Neg and not vice versa (c-command definition based on lack of exclusion). As a result, English has TNIs.

Han realizes, of course, that there are Ls with preverbal negation that still have TNIs (Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian). What about those?
(diacritics missing below)

(37) Ne ja ceti!Bulgarian
   Neg it read

(38) Ne citaj je!   Serb, Croatian

Han's answer: the verb is not in C in overt syntax, as evidenced by the fact that clitics can appear preverbally (argument taken from Rivero and Terzi):

Bulgarian:

(39) Knjige   im citajte!
   Books to-them read   (Rivero and Terzi)

At LF the imperative feature moves to C. Following Chomsky 95, Han says that feature movement[26] moves formal features, not interpretive features. So the interpretive feature of Neg does not get to C. So the Imp verb is not in the scope of negation.

OK, so why does the subjunctive appear in negative commands?

The subjunctive is not in C, as evidenced by the fact that clitics must be preverbal:

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[26] In case you don't remember what 'feature movement' is, you should know that it was substituted by "Agree", which for current purposes is the same.

(40) na min to fas! Greek
        Neg it eat
   "don't eat it"

(41) No me deis el libro!   Spanish /Han
       Neg me give the book
       'Don't give me the book!"

The "subjunctive operator" is in C and forms a chain with Infl/verb. "Crucially, the subjunctive operator does not encode illocutionary force. But it does encode the modality of irrealis. Since subjunctives do not have an illocutionary force operator, the question of the availability of negative forms does not come up. As for the question of why (negative) subjunctives can express directive force, we have already seen Han's answer to: "…all matrix sentences express a certain illocutionary force, thereby allowing the speakers to use them to perform a certain illocutionary act (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). When subjunctives are used in matrix contexts, the subjunctive operator can generate directive force via pragmatic inference since directive force is compatible with irrealis interpretation" Han:317

She correctly points out that directive are not the only uses for the subjunctives in Greek and Spanish. For her, this is an argument in favor of her position, as the command interpretation of the subjunctive is only a pragmatic inference. [though in bona fide imperatives these other interpretations are possible too]

And why the infinitive?

In negative contexts, Italian substitutes the 2nd singular with an infinitive. Moreover, a clitic can appear either before or after the verb[27]:

(42) Non farlo!
   Non lo fare!
   Don't do it!

Basically, Han will follow Kayne 1992 in saying that there is an empty modal in these cases (which can be overt in Paduan *sta*, which is imperative-specific). The infinitive that

---

[27] The 2nd plu is a wellbehaved imperative in that it preceds the clitic, but a badly behaved one (wrt Italian and Han's theory) in that it can be negated.:

i. Non fatelo   (taken to be imperative) (also the order in infinitives)
   Neg do it

Han: In (i) the verb moves to a position higher than infl but lower than C. Hence the clitic order. From there, there is feature movement to C. Hence the possibility for being negated.

we see is the complement of this modal. The optionality of clitic placement is the result of clitic climbing onto the modal, and clitic climbing is anyway always optional.

And what about negation? Isn't the Imp/modal in the scope of Negation, given that this is a clitic in Italian? Han's answer to this is that the way the scope of modals differs wrt negation, this particular modal scopes over negation. So the illocutionary force operator ends up outside the scope of negation.

4.1.c Zeijlstra 2006

Criticism of Han 2001:

- If feature movement happens in Slavic, why should it not happen in Romance?
- An overt negative marker is not always the carrier of semantic negation. In these cases it does not matter if it has the force operator in its scope.

What is the second point about?

According to Zeijlstra, some negative markers do indeed contribute semantic negation. These have the feature [iNeg] ("i" for "interpretable; Chomsky 2000 and later). Other negative markers do not; these are [uNeg]. Like all elements with uninterpretable features, they must be matched/valued by a c-commanding interpretable feature (Chomsky). For the case at hand and within Zeijlstra's assumptions, this means that in languages where the overt negative marker is [uNeg], there is a covert negative operator that values the [uNeg] marker. The semantics of negation in the sentence is contributed by that covert negative operator. So languaes are either as in (43) or as in (44):

 (43)   ..... [iNeg].....
 (44)   ….Op$_{[iNeg]}$ ……[uNeg] …   (where Op$_{[iNeg]}$ is covert)

Here is some of Zeijlstra's evidence for the existence of [uNeg] and [iNeg] negative markers:

Consider the phenomenon of Negative Concord, in which 2 negative elements yield only one semantic negation.

There is strict and non-strict NC:
Strict NC Ls: N-words[28] must always be accompanied by the negative marker
Non-strict NC: only post-verbal n-words have a negative marker; preverbal ones don't:

Strict NC:

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[28] Terms from Laka 1990 and Giannakidou 2002

(45) a. Milan *(ne) vidi nikoho   Czech
       Milan NEG.saw n-body
       'Milan didn't see anybody'

    b. Dnes *(ne)volá nikdo
       Today NEG.calls n-body
       'Today nobody calls'

    c. Dnes nikdo *(ne)volá
       Today n-body NEG.calls
       'Today nobody calls'

Non-strict NC:

(46) a. Gianni *(non) ha telefonato a nessuno   Italian
       Gianni NEG has called to n-body
       'Gianni didn't call anybody'

    b. Ieri *(non) ha telefonato nessuno
       Yesterday NEG has called n-body
       'Yesterday nobody called'

    c. Ieri nessuno (*non) ha telefonato (a nessuno)
       Yesterday nobody NEG has called to n-body
       'Yesterday nobody called anybody'

Zeijlstra 2004: NC is multiple Agree between a [iNeg] Negative operator and [uNeg] elements (n-words).
This means that all [uNeg] elements must be in the c-command domain of a [iNeg] negation to still have a neg concord reading.

In strict NC languages, where n-words can precede the negative marker, we conclude that the negative marker is not [iNeg]. Something higher must be [iNeg], a covert negative operator[29].

In short, in non-strict NC Ls, the negative marker is [iNeg]. In strict NC Ls, the negative marker is [uNeg].

More evidence that there are [uNeg] negation markers:

In strict NC Ls, a quantifier like the one below is interpreted inside negation because it is under the covert Neg operator even when it is outside the syntactic scope of the overt negative marker, predicting the Neg>Q reading.

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[29] Such a covert neg operator can also exist in non-strict Ls for preverbal n-words.

(47)   a. Milan moc nejedl   Czech [30]
        Milan much NEG.eat.PERF
        ¬ > much: 'Milan hasn't eaten much'
       *much > ¬: 'There is much that Milan didn't eat'

In non-strict NC Ls, a Q outside the syntactic scope of the negative marker, is also interpreted outside it, as the negative marker *is* [iNeg].

    b. Molto non ha mangiato Gianni   Italian
           Much NEG has eaten Gianni
     *¬ > much: 'Gianni hasn't eaten much'
       much > ¬: 'There is much that Gianni didn't eat'

  [significance of subject placement?]

Also in strict NC Ls, if an N-word is preverbal, the negative marker can be absent because the covert Neg operator takes care of the n-word (from Giannakidou 2005):

(48)   a. O Jannis *(dhen) dhiavase oute kan tis Sindaktikes Dhomes   Greek
          The Jannis neg reads even the Syntactic Structures
          'Jannis doesn't read even Syntactic Structures'

       b. Oute kan ti Maria (dhen) proskalese o pritanis
          Even Maria NEG invite the dean
          'Not even Maria did the dean invite'

Zeijlstra:
So, some negative markers are [iNeg] and some [uNeg].

In addition, some are heads and some are XPs[31].

These 2 sets of features give us 4 combinations. Below is a table with Ls inserted appropriately:

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[30] Greek is the same way. If you want wide scope of something "many problems' in such sentences you have to use CLLD.

[31] Tests cited for this are clitic climbing and the possibility to adjoin to XPs like *why*.

Table 2

	[iNeg]	[uNeg]
X	Spanish, Italian Portuguese (Class I)	**Czech, Polish, Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian Standard French (Class II)** Greek, Romanian, Hebrew, Hungarian (Class III)
XP	**Dutch, German, Norwegian, Swedish (Class IV)**	**Bavarian, Yiddish, Quebecois(Class V)**

The bold-faced Ls have TNIs.

So here are Zeijlstra's generalizations[32]:

G1: Every language with an overt negative marker X° that carries [iNEG] bans TNIs.
 G2: Every language that bans TNIs exhibits an overt negative marker X°.

To derive the above picture we need 3 assumptions:

I. Op_{imp} must take scope from C
II. Op_{imp} cannot be scoped over by semantic negation (Han)
III. The Head Movement Constraint or appropriate relativized minimality story

Now let's go through all the L classes.

Class I:
 Han's analysis: the verb picks up negation and can't shake it when it gets to C, leaving OP under negation.

Class II:

---

[32] G2 was already present in Zanuttini 1997 according to Zeijlstra. G1 is Zeijlstra's.

The overt neg marker does not matter, as it is [uNeg]. The covert [iNeg] neg operator is in spec/Negp. The verb moves up, picks up negation and goes to C. But that doesn't matter because it is safely away from the scope of [iNeg] OP:

(49)

French is like Polish only that **OP** is *pas*.

<u>Class III</u>:

This is a mixed class.

Greek and Hebrew:
There are specialized negative markers in Greek and Hebrew (mi and ?al) which are [iNeg]. This can be shown from the fact that with these negations, you get non-strict NC. So Greek and Hebrew are Class I, in effect.

Hungarian:
Hungarian has 2 negative markers and is actually Class II (as we said earlier)

Romanian:
The Romanian negative marker blocks the verb from moving over it. As a result, the imperative verb cannot go to C. Hence no TNIs. How do we know that negation blocks verb-movement? Because of the following:

(50)   a. M-as mira se vina Ion   Romanian
          Me-AUX.SUBJB be.surprised AUX.SUBJB come Ion
          'I would be surprised if Ion came'

          b. Mira m-as se vina Ion

Be.surprised me-AUX.SUBJB AUX.SUBJB come Ion
'I would be surprised if Ion came'

(51) a. Nu m-as mira se vina Ion   Romanian
         NEG me-AUX.SUBJB be.surprised AUX.SUBJB come Ion
         'I wouldn't be surprised if Ion came'

      b. *Mira nu m-as se vina Ion
          Be.surprised NEG me-AUX.SUBJB AUX.SUBJB come Ion
          'I wouldn't be surprised if Ion came'

      c. *Mira m-as nu se vina Ion
          Be.surprised me-AUX.SUBJB NEG AUX.SUBJB come Ion
          'I wouldn't be surprised if Ion came'

Class IV:

XP neg markers cause no problems for the verb moving over them to C. Hence, these Ls
have TNIs. (G2).

Class V:
As above, if negation is not am X, the verb can get to C and we get TNIs.

So:

G1 because a non-strict NC L has [iNeg] negative marker and if that marker is an X,
TNIs will be blocked.
G2 because if an L has an XP negation, TNIs are allowed.

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4.1.d How do our three candidate proposals fare in light of these analyses?

If Rivero and Rivero &Terzi are right, all that would be needed is an element that triggers
V-to-C movement in some languages. All three proposals have this:
-For Han it is the [directive] feature that attracts the verb.
-Schwager just postulates an +imp feature explicitly and solely for V-movement
purposes, though she says that its content would need to be investigated further.
-Portner recognizes that something attracts the verb up and makes some speculative
remarks to the effect that it may be the functional projection responsible for restricting
the subject of the imperative to the addressee.

And what if Han and Zeijlstra are right that the imperative operator cannot end up in the
scope of negation and that that is the/one of the factors ruling out TNIs in a language?

First of all, it is very important to understand something about the Han/Zeijlstra proposal.

Consider the following two claims:

A. The illocutionary force operator cannot be embedded under negation because of its *semantics*.
B. The illocutionary force operator cannot be in the *syntactic* scope of negation.

Han and Zeijlstra assume (A). However, when they say they derive the absence of TNIs in certain languages they try to do so by showing that (B) would be violated in those languages if there were TNIs. However, A and B are not identical. The literature is full of cases where an element β is in the syntactic c-command domain of an element α, but where β is interpreted as scoping over α. So it could very well be that the illocutionary force operator ends up in the syntactic scope of negation but it still scopes over negation semantically.

So even if Han/Zeijlstra are right that there is a restriction against having the illocutionary force operator in the syntactic scope of negation, this syntactic restriction is not dictated by the semantics. It would be an *independent syntactic* constraint on the relationship between the imperative operator and negation that rules out TNIs in certain languages.

With this in mind, let us look at each of the three candidate proposals.

-Han:
The Han/Zeijlstra line is custom-made for Han 2000. However, the above question remains: the syntactic restriction does not follow from the semantics of the illocutionary force operator. So the absence of TNIs would have to be attributed to the *syntactic* constraint, not anything having to do with the semantic scope properties of the imperative operator, which could in principle semantically scope over negation..

-Schwager:
According to Schwager, imperatives contain a modal, and here again the same issue arises: Modals are interpreted over or under negation regardless of what the linear order/overt c-command relationship is between the modal and negation. So for example, deontic *may not* is interpreted *not>may*[33]. While this mismatch of syntactic and semantic scope between negation and modals is wide-spread crosslinguistically, we do not know what it is due to. However, it does mean that getting the modal in the *syntactic* scope of negation is not fatal for the creation of TNIs, as the semantic scope of the two elements can be different. So the absence of TNIs would have to be attributed to a syntactic stipulation that the imperative modal cannot be in the *syntactic* scope of negation.

How about deriving TNIs from a *semantic* constraint against having the imperative modal under negation? For Schwager this would mean that there is a semantic constraint against placing the performative modal in the scope of negation. However, this performative

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[33] Also plenty cases of the reverse: Greek *dhen prepi* (Neg must) is interpreted Modal>Neg.

modal is just a modal that comes with certain presuppositions that add performativity to it. And modals *can* appear in the semantic scope of negation (*can, have to, need to,* deontic *may*). So why wouldn't the imperative modal be able to appear in the scope of negation? It is certainly not the "performativity" aspect of the modal that would block its being embedded under negation. For Schwager, "performativity" reduces to certain presuppositions: the Authority Condition, the Epistemic Uncertainty Condition, the Ordering Source Affirmation. These presuppositions would just survive the scope of negation.[34]

In short, it doesn't seem that Schwager and Han/Zeijlstra line on the lack of TNIs in certain languages are compatible in any obvious way.

-Portner:
Portner also does not seem compatible with Han/Zeijlstra. Recall that for Portner imperatives are just (addressee-restricted) properties. So there is nothing in Portner's account of which we can say that it cannot be in the scope of negation. What would remain is just a syntactic stipulation that the imperative verb cannot end up in the scope of negation in some languages.

4.2. *Non-command readings: Permission*

As we said earlier, imperative sentences are not just used as commands; they have several different uses, one among which is that of permission. Here are some examples:

(1) Have a beer!
(2) Come in!
(3) Go to the movies, if you like!

While commands can be paraphrased with a universal deontic modal, permissions would be paraphrased with an existential deontic modal:

(4) You may come in.
(5) You may go to the movies

These facts are very interesting as they seem an obvious difficulty for the position that an imperative contains a syntactic/semantic annotation that determines its meaning to be that

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[34] What *does* happen when a performative modal semantically scopes under negation? The result could be something like the speaker declaring the addressee free of a certain obligation, just as in (i) (Neg>Modal>φ). However, (ii) clearly does not have this meaning.

    i.   You don't have to do the dishes
    ii.   Don't do the dishes

of command. Let's see what three candidates have to say about the permission reading of imperatives.

4.2.a Han 2000

There are Indirect Speech Acts, in which a sentence is associated with a force different from its canonical one. For example, the question *Can you please pass the salt?* is not meant as a request for information, but a request for action. The declarative *Your services are no longer required* is the (speech) act of firing someone.

The permission uses of the imperative form are achieved in similar vein.
When A has expressed a desire for *p*, it means that *p* is already on A's plan set. By uttering an imperative (directive (irrealis (*p*))), you are acknowledging A's plan, rather than instructing to update the plan.

Similarly for Wishes like *Have a nice day!*, Dares and Threats like *Go ahead. Hit me.*

Declaratives can also express the opposite of what they mean:

(6)   A: Clinton messed up again
       B: Yeah, he is really smart (sarcastic)

"Just as we would not want to complicate the literal meaning of declaratives to handle uses as in [(6)], we would not want to complicate the literal meaning of imperatives to handle the former. Instead, they should be handled by Gricean reasoning and inferences" 169-170.

4.2.b Portner

Portner 2004:
 All uses of imperatives are to add a property to the addressee's To-Do List, that is, the sentential force of all Imperatives is "Requiring" [35]. The differences stem from "…the pragmatic or sociolinguistic basis for the speaker's attempt to add a property to the addressee's To-Do List. *Orders* occur when the basis is social authority. *Requests* occur when no social authority is invoked, and the basis is the speaker's or addressee's benefit. *Permissions* occur when the property is understood to be one the addressee herself wants on her To-Do List" (2004, p.4).

Portner 2007: There is a variety of To-Do Lists (or sections of a To-Do List), just like there is a variety of ordering sources:

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[35] For Portner, "requiring" is the update function of imperatives, i.e. the addition of a property to a To-Do List.

(7) Sit down right now!
      (goes to that (section of the) To-Do list that represents orders)
(8) Have a piece of fruit!
      (goes to that (section of the) To-Do list that represents desires)
(9) Talk to your advisor more often!
      (goes to that (section of the) To-Do list that represents goals)

Specifically for permissions, however, Portner 2007, fn. 6, says the following:

 "Wilson and Sperber (1988) suggest that permission imperatives are simply imperatives representing something the addressee desires. More recently, Schwager (2005a) has made more or less this same proposal in terms of a modal semantics for imperatives. This idea seems right to me. I will not discuss permission sentences in this paper, since they are such a difficult topic as to require 40 pages on their own. I speculate, though, that the difference between invitations, discussed here, and permissions is whether it is presupposed that the speaker has the authority to prohibit the act in question."

4.2.c Schwager 2006

Like Han, Schwager believes that in permission readings, the semantic content of the imperative remains what it is in commands, but that it is particular contexts that bring out the permission readings. Specifically, for an utterance like (10) to be interpreted as a permission, the context has to meet the conditions in (11).

(10) Take an apple!

(11) "It has to be presupposed that

          [A] The addressee wants to
               [i] take an apple, and to
               [ii] please the speaker, and that

          [B] The addressee is not allowed to take an apple by the speaker
               (consequently, taking an apple would upset the speaker)"

We see that these conditions are strongly reminiscent of Han's conditions on the appearance of the permission. However, Schwager goes into more detail.

She will rely on a meaning postulate according to which "no one is pleased if his prohibitions are disobeyed..." (Schwager 2006, p. 171). This means that [Ai], [Aii] and [B] cannot be satisfied in the same world(s).

This means that in the set of worlds where [B] holds, that is, where the addressee is not allowed to take an apple, the subset of worlds in which the addressee takes an apple (p_a) and the subset of worlds in which the speaker is pleased (p_s) have an empty intersection:

Worlds where [B] is not true

Worlds where [B] is true

p_s | p_a

$\sim p_a$ & $\sim p_s$

In other words, the two things that the speaker wants (Ai=p_a and Aii=p_s) are in conflict with each other, and there is no world in which both are met at the same time. It also means that in the relevant context, the imperative is not defined, because Schwager has it as presupposition of any imperative that the action be under the control of the addressee, and clearly the addressee cannot both take an apple and please the speaker in this context. However, given that we assume a cooperative addressee, the latter has to then make certain accommodations so that the speaker's utterance be consistent.

At this point, Schwager says, the addressee can do certain things to interpret the speaker's utterance as consistent. One possible course of action will lead to the permission reading of the imperative:

The adressee can give up [B] (=the presupposition of the particular context according to which the speaker does not want the addressee to take an apple). This we call the "permission" reading of the imperative[36]. Now, the conflict is resolved and the imperative is well-defined.

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[36] The other option will lead to the (more marked) Concessive reading. Schwager's example of a concessive reading is the following:

i. (Go ahead) and take an apple (if you think you are so clever)!

The concessive reading is achieved by giving up [Aii] (=the presupposition of the particular context according to which that the addressee wants to please the speaker).

What we see from Han and Schwager then, is that they do not alter the semantic content of the imperative to bring about the permission reading. However, this is in conflict with findings by Grosz 2008.

Grosz investigates German discourse particles, and in particular *JA*[37] and *ruhig*. Neither of these can appear in declaratives that are not modalized; the former needs a universal modal, the latter an existential:

(12) *Du gehst da   JA/ ruhig hin
   you go   there   JA/ ruhig to
    'You go [JA/ ruhig] there'

(13) Du   sollst da JA/* ruhig hingehen
    You shall there JA/* ruhig go.to
    'You shall [JA/* ruhig] go there'

(14) Du kannst da ruhig/*JA   hingehen
    You can there ruhig /*JA go.to
    'You can [ruhig/*JA] go there'

Grosz discovered that while both particles are permitted in imperatives, the command reading can only take *JA* and the permission reading can only take *ruhig*:

(15) Geh da JA /#ruhig   hin!   Sonst wirst   du bestraft
    Go there JA /#ruhig to   else   will.be you punished
    'Go [JA / # ruhig] there! Or else you'll be punished'   (command)

(16) Geh   da ruhig /#JA hin! Das   ist vollkomen in Ordnung.
    Go there ruhig /#JA to   that is completely in order
    'Go [ruhig /#JA] there! It's completely ok to go there.'   (permission)

From these and similar facts, Grosz concludes that while Schwager (and in a way Han) is right to postulate a modal element in imperatives, she is wrong to think that it may only

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That is, the addressee "interprets the utterance as saying something like *You don't want to conform to my wishes/orders*" (Schwager 2006, p.174)

[37] Grosz capitalizes JA to emphasize that they are stressed. This is important for him as it is the only way to distinguish these particle from unstressed *ja* (discussed in Kratzer 1999 and others), which have different syntax and different semantics.

be universal: there are two imperative modals, one with universal and one with existential force[38,39].

It should be noted, though, that in the last chapter of her dissertation, entitled "Afterthoughts", Schwager considers the possibility that the force of the imperative modal might be existential after all[40].

However, given that the default reading of an imperative according to Schwager is still that of command, she argues that there is an exhaustivity operator on top of the existential imperative modal, which therefore gives the net result of necessity to an imperative. The permission reading is then the result of this operator not applying being blocked.

(17) Exhaustive possibility:
         p is possible (w.r.t. background b) and nothing else is possible

"Apart from its presuppositional meaning component, the imperative operator OP*imp* is semantically equivalent to the modal verb *may*" (314).

In the unmarked case, an exhaustivity operator applies to the existential modal making the possibility in question the *only* possibility. This is why a command is the unmarked interpretation of an imperative.

The appearance of this exhaustivity operator can be blocked by the item *for example*[41]:

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[38] Grosz rejects the position that the permission reading of imperatives comes about only when it is presupposed that the addressee wanted to do the action anyway (both Han and Schwager) on the basis of examples like the following:

i. Greif den Frosch   ruhig an! Der tut   dir   nichts.
    Touch the frog   ruhig   PRT   it does you nothing
  'Touch [ruhig] the frog! It won't hurt you'

However, one might be concerned with this conclusion based on the fact that the child to whom this is uttered fits the stereotype of the children who deep down want to experience the thrill of something scary.

[39] In lectures at ESSLI 2008, Schwager responds to Grosz, partly disagreeing with the data. As I only have handouts of these, though, I hesitate to summarize them here.

[40] That is, contra to Grosz, who wants the imperative modal to be ambiguous, on the "afterthoughts" proposal Schwager would have the modal be only existential.

[41] Note that the verb *kauf* is an imperative and not an infinitive, so the derivation wherein B's utterance is the argument of an elided modal, overtly present in the question, is excluded.

(18)   A: What could I do to stop smoking?
       B: Kauf   zum Beispiel keine Zigaretten!
   Buy.Imp for example no cigarettes
   'For example, don't buy cigarettes'

However, Schwager does not discuss, at least in this "Afterthoughts" chapter, how exactly the permission reading would be brought about. Note that while (18) may indeed be interpreted as an existential modal, it is still not a permission. Neither does the context meet conditions [A-B] from (11), which she requires of the context in the chapter on permissions. So it is not clear, at least from the "Afterthoughts" chapter, how she would handle the conditions on the context.

4.3 *Superbly Interesting Conjunctions*

Imperatives can appear as a first conjunct, with the second conjunct being a declarative. We will adopt Schwager's term "IaD" (Imperative *and* Declarative) for this construction:

(1) Study hard and you will pass the class.
(2) Ignore your homework and you will fail the class.

Why are these so interesting? Because (2) is used to get the addressee to *not* ignore the homework by pointing out its undesirable consequence in the second conjunct. But if this is so, how can (2) contain the imperative "ignore your homework"?

Certainly, an imperative by itself never has this effect; 3 does not tell the addressee to *not* ignore the homework:

(3) Ignore your homework!

Another way to restate the problem is the following:
IaDs with a positive second conjunct, like 1, can and have been described as involving modal subordination, that is, as containing disguised conditionals. This means that (1) can be paraphrased as in (4). However, (2) cannot be paraphrased as in (5):

(1) Study hard and you will pass the class. =
(4) Study hard. If you do, you will pass the class.

(2) Ignore your homework and you will fail the class. ≠
(5) Ignore your homework. If you do, you will fail the class.

We will call the IaDs that contain the meaning of directive and that are amenable to the paraphrase containing an imperative, as in (1)/(4), Type I IaDs. We will call the IaDs with the undesirable consequent, which cannot be paraphrased as containing an imperative, as in (2)/(5), Type II IaDs.

That is: IaDs with undesirable second conjuncts are always Type II IaDs[42].

In short: the imperative verb can appear when the speaker is trying to get the addressee to *not* do what the imperative VP says. What should this tell us about our theories of the Imperative?

4.3.a Type I IaDs

Let us start with Type I IaDs, which have been taken to be the "easier" ones as the imperative verb still retains the meaning of a directive in them.

Schwager 2006 and Russell 2007 have similar accounts for Type I IaDs:

- Type I IaDs are conjunctions of speech acts[43].
- Type I IaDs contain modal subordination[44] (Roberts 1989)

Because it is a speech act conjunction, the meaning of the imperative is not "buried" in the conjunction (however this is derived), i.e. the meaning of the imperative is retained in its full glory. Subsequently, Modal Subordination takes us to the worlds in which the imperative is satisfied. In effect, after the imperative speech act has been uttered, a conditional is created in which the modal *will* is restricted by an antecedent like *if you study hard* and the consequent of this conditional is the second conjunct.

All this gives us the composite meaning of Type I IaD[45]:

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[42] We will see later that there is reason to believe that all IaDs with undesirable consequents are Type II but that IaDs with desirable consequents can be Type I or Type II.

[43] Krifka (2001) is credited with the idea that speech acts can be conjoined. Speech act *and* conjoins two sentences that already have force and returns another speech act. The result is as if the two speech acts applied in succession.

[44] In particular, modal subordination of the following type (Roberts 1989, p. 699): "The approach I suggest, which I will call **the accommodation of the missing antecedent** approach to modal subordination, is the pragmatic **accommodation** of a contextually given hypothetical common ground to be the antecedent of the modally subordinated clause".

[45] And indeed, IaDs provide the anaphora which is a well-known trademark of modal subordination:
(i) Plant a fig tree and it will give you plenty of good shade.

(1) Study hard and you will pass the class. =
(6) Study hard! In the worlds in which you study hard you pass the class.

Speech act conjunction is taken to be the same as speech act sequencing (henceforth "I.D"s, with "I" representing the period between two sentences in the discourse). That is, 7 is supposed to result in 6 as well, just like 1, with modal subordination.

(7) Study hard! You will pass the exam. =
(6) Study hard! In the worlds in which you study hard you pass the class.

Certainly such an account seems to intuitively capture what we feel Type I IaDs to be saying. This is probably the reason why this idea is common to many accounts.

Unfortunately, on closer inspection, there are some difficulties that have to be dealt with:

P1: This account predicts that sentences with universal deontic modals should be amenable to a similar derivation. But this is not true. Compare Type I IaDs with MaDs (Modal *and* Declarative).

Type I IaDs don't behave like MaDs:

(8) a. Invest in this company and you will become rich. ≠
     b. */??[46] You have to/must[47]/should invest in this company and you will become rich.

(9) a. Speak to them in French and they will hire you immediately. ≠
     b. */??You have to/must/should speak to them in French and they will hire you immediately.

On the other hand, in speech act sequencing (as opposed to speech act conjunction), I.Ds and M.Ds do behave the same:

But I.Ds do behave like M.Ds:

(10) a. Invest in this company. You will become rich. =
      b. You must /have to/ should invest in this company. You will become rich.

(11) a. Speak to them in French. They will hire you. =
      b. You must speak to them in French. They will hire you.

In other words:

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[46] The judgment is for the reading of a sentence where the second conjunct is modally subordinated to the first. The sentences are fine as plain conjunctions, of course.

[47] The judgment holds even for *must*, which is taken to have performative uses (Ninan 2005)

Modal Subordination (*the* crucial ingredient in this account) is possible in sequencing with modalized sentences and imperatives alike. However, Modal Subordination in conjunction is possible only with imperatives, not with modalized sentences.
Why should this be? There is nothing (yet) in our knowledge of modal subordination that could explain this.

– If we say that modal subordination happens only in sequencing and not in conjunction (which would be a difficult thing to maintain), we can explain why MaDs do not have it but we are left with no account whatsoever for Type I IaDs.
– If we say that modal subordination happens in conjunction as well as sequencing, we loose the MaDs.

At first glance, this seems more of a problem for Schwager, for whom Imperatives are modalized sentences. However, it is actually a problem for anyone for whom Type I IaDs are speech act conjunctions with modal subordination, regardless of their views on the semantic make-up of the imperative.

P2: A second problem that arises if we take Type I IaDs to contain an imperative followed by modal subordination is the following:

An imperative in sequencing (I.Ds) can involve modal subordination with a polarity switch:

(12) a. Don't park there. You will be towed. =
        Don't park there. If you do, you will be towed.

     b. Conserve your energy. You will run out of breath. =
        Conserve your energy. If you don't, you will run out of breath.

That is, modal subordination in (12) takes us to the worlds in which the first clause is *not* satisfied (polarity switch). However, such a polarity switch is not possible in conjunction cases (IaDs[48]):

(13) a. Don't park there and you will be towed. ≠
        Don't park there. If you do, you will be towed.

     b. Conserve your energy and you will run out of breath. ≠
        Conserve your energy. If you don't, you will run out of breath

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[48] The fact that the first conjunct retains its imperative meaning (that is, the speaker does want the addressee to not park there in (13a), and does want her or him to conserve energy in (13b)) makes these sentences Type I IaDs.

The only meaning that (13) can have is the one where the polarity is maintained, i.e., where you will be towed if you *don't* park there and where you will run out of breath if you conserve your energy.
This is another problem for reducing Type I IaDs to just an imperative and modal subordination.

Polarity switch is a known possibility for modal subordination. For example, von Fintel 1994 (p. 75) attributes the following example to Partee 1972[49]:

(14) John won't buy a car because he wouldn't have space for it in his garage
=John won't buy a car because in the worlds in which he does buy a car he does not have space for it in his garage.

In addition, polarity switch is possible in sequencing not just with I.Ds but also with M.Ds:

(15)   You must not park on the even side on the street. You will get towed. =
       You must not park on the even side of the street. If you do, you will get towed.

(16)   You should conserve your energy. You will run out of breath. =
       You should conserve your energy. If you don't, you will run out of breath.

MaDs, with modal subordination are not grammatical and thus we cannot test their behavior with respect to polarity switch and thereby compare IaDs to MaDs. It suffices to say that if IaDs are reduced to speech act conjunction and modal

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[49] It seems that polarity switch is easier from negative to positive than from positive to negative:

(i)   Don't park on the even side of the street today. You will get towed. =
      Don't park on the even side of the street today. If you park on the even side, you will get towed.

(ii) Park on the odd side of the street today. You will get towed. ≠
      Park on the odd side of the street today. If you park on the even side (i.e. if you don't park on the odd side) you will get towed.

That is, it seems easier to subtract a negation rather than add one. However, example (12b) from the text and (iii) below show that this is not necessarily so.

(iii) Be careful. You will fall. =
      Be careful. If you aren't, you will fall.

It is unclear what the difference between (ii) and (12b)/(iii) is due to.

subordination, there is no reason whatsoever why they should not be able to have a polarity switch. And yet, polarity switch is out for IaDs.

P3: A third property of IaDs that seems to set them apart from other known cases of modal subordination is that typically, modal subordination, in particular the type that involves accommodation of a missing antecedent, permits a choice between *will* and *would*, even when the first clause is an imperative:

(17) Read that book by Max. You will like it.
(18) Read that book by Max. You would like it.

Possibly this choice reflects the choice in the accommodated antecedent: *if you do* .. versus *If you did,.....* However, in IaDs, the choice can be only *will*:

(19) Study hard and you will pass the class.
(20) *Study hard and you would pass the class.

So this is another place where IaDs behave differently from the known cases of modal subordination.

P4: Finally, it seems that there are in general cases of I.Ds with Modal Subordination that cannot be expressed as IaDs:

(21) a. Go see that movie. You will like it.
      b. */?Go see that movie and you will like it.

(22) a. Eat that bagel. It will fill you up. (variation of Roberts's (29), p.708)
      b. */?Eat that bagel and it will fill you up.

For the aforementioned theories of Type I IaDs, a,b examples of (21-22) should behave identically, contrary to fact.

In summary, while the speech act conjunction plus modal subordination account seems intuitively appealing, it does face a few difficulties.

4.3.b Type II IaDs

Remember that this is the IaDs in which the speaker is trying to get the addressee to NOT do what the imperative verb says:

(23) Ignore your homework and you will fail the class (= (2))
(24) Insult him and he will get you fired.
(25) Don't study hard and you will fail the exam.
(26) Continue this way and you will be dead before you are 20.
(27) Eat that and your cholesterol will go through the roof.

<u>Han 2000</u>

Han 2000 argues that no type of IaDs contains a true imperative. That is, Han does not make the Type I versus Type II distinction. She argues that the first conjunct of neither type is an imperative. Instead, she transforms IaDs into conditional statements[50]. That is, (28) somehow becomes (29):

(28) Study hard and you will succeed.
(29) If you study hard, you will succeed.

The reason Conjunct1 can do this, Han says, is because it has the feature [irrealis] (though not [directive], which would have made it an imperative).

However, it remains unclear how the morphosyntax of Conjunct1 generates the desired semantics, as no compositional account is given.

In addition, if such a "defective"/"stripped" imperative is possible in an IaD, why couldn't the same happen to an embedded imperative? Recall Han says that true imperatives cannot be embedded because of their [directive] feature.

Han says we *think* that some IaDs contain a directive for action (the ones we call Type I) but that is not the result of them containing an imperative. It is the result of Conjunct2

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[50] Actually, Han describes her account as making an IaD similar to a conditional statement (p.199-200) and indeed, Russell p. 25 describes Han's account in those terms as well. However, in the section where she formalizes the description within a dynamic semantics model (p.197-200) she argues that Conjunct1 is interpreted like a *might*-statement, introducing a hypothetical possibility, about which Conjunct2 then makes a modally subordinated claim:

(i) Study hard and you will succeed.
(ii) You might study hard and then you will succeed.

being desirable, from which we draw the conclusion that we have an incentive to do what Conjunct1 describes.

So for Han, (30) does not contain an imperative any more than (31) does:

(30) Come closer and I will give you five dollars.
(31) Come closer and I'll shoot.

They both end up being something like this:

(32) You might come closer and then I will give you five dollars.
(33) You might come closer and then I will shoot.

Russell 2006 [51]

Russell claims that Conjunct1 in a Type I IaD is an imperative but Conjunct1 in a Type II IaD is not. If Conjunct1 in Type II is not an imperative, we do not need to worry about where the directive meaning has disappeared to. Though Russell gives some properties of Type II IaDs, he does not try to give a full account of them. That is, his main point is that Type II IaDs do not contain imperatives but Type I IaDs do.

Russell will take what Han claimed that she showed, namely, that IaDs contain no imperative, and then he will argue that it is true of Type II only. That is, he will claim that Type II behaves the way Han thought *all* IaDs behave. However, Russell says, Type I *does* contain an imperative.

In short, recall what we said earlier:

We will call the IaDs that contain the meaning of directive and that are amenable to the paraphrase containing an imperative, as in (1)/(4), Type I IaDs. We will call the IaDs with the undesirable consequent, which cannot be paraphrased as containing an imperative, as in (2)/(5), Type II IaDs.
That is: IaDs with undesirable second conjuncts are always Type II IaDs.

Russell refines this point:

Russell argues that there are two types of derivation for IaDs. IaDs with undesirable consequents can only undergo a Type II derivation, the one that does not contain a imperative. IaDs with desirable consequents can undergo a Type I, if they contain an imperative, or a Type II derivation, which does not contain an imperative. For this reason,

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[51] Although Russell admits that his account has elements of Han's, see his p. 25 for some criticism of her proposal.

we can find IaDs with desirable consequents pattern with those with undesirable consequents on some grammatical tests. These IaDs with desirable consequents will have undergone a Type II derivation.

Type II derivation is also what "neutral" IaDs undergo. What is meant by "neutral" is those IaDs where the speaker is neither trying to get the hearer to do what the first conjunct conveys, nor trying to dissuade the hearer from the action in Conjunct1. Here are some examples of neutral IaDs (attributed by Russell to Bolinger 1967 and Franke 2005):

(34) Tell him anything and he just looks at you blankly.
(35) Open the Guardian and you'll find three misprints on every page.
(36) Guillaume buys that statuette and he'll have twenty-five in his collection

Since these do not contain an imperative, they are per force a Type II derivation for Russell.

So what are the two derivations according to Russell?

The Type I derivation is like the one containing speech act conjunction that we have already discussed: The first conjunct contains an imperative. Russell basically adopts Portner's semantics for imperatives. Subsequently, modal subordination/a covert antecedent takes us to the worlds in which the imperative is satisfied. The second conjunct functions as the consequent of this antecedent:

(1) Study hard and you will pass the class. =
(6) Study hard! In the worlds in which you study hard you pass the class.
      Study hard! If you study hard, you will pass the class.

This account of Type I IaDs has the advantages and disadvantages that we mentioned earlier.

What about Type II IaDs?

As we will see, Russell gives arguments that the first conjunct in a Type II IaD is not an imperative (with Han on this) but that Type I does (contra Han).
What is the nature of Conjunct1 in Type II for Russell then? Russell says that it is a bare infinitive, the nature of which he does not investigate much[52] and he acknowledges that

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[52] Though Russell is very explicit about not committing himself to the nature of this bare VP, he speculates that they may be simple present declaratives with deletion of subject *you*. The existence of such deletion is motivated by sentences like the following:

(i) Want a cracker?

he really has no account for it. However, he does say that Type II properties are reminiscent of Jackendoff and Cullicover's 1997 "Left Subordinating *and*" or "$_{LS}$and".

Cullicover and Jackendoff 1997 (CJ) discuss a variety of points at which simple "coordinating" conjunction (*and*$_C$) differs from what they call "Left Subordinating Conjunction" ($_{LS}$*and*), which permits a conditional paraphrase.
CJ will ultimately argue that $_{LS}$*and* is basically *if* with the first conjunct being the antecedent and the second conjunct the consequent of the conditional.

One of the differences between *and*$_C$ and $_{LS}$*and* is the following:
$_{LS}$*and* permits a pronoun in the first conjunct to covary with a quantifier in the second conjunct but *and*$_C$ does not.

(37) You give him enough opportunity $_{LS}$and every senator, no matter how honest, will succumb to corruption.
(38) *We gave him enough opportunity and$_C$ every senator, no matter how honest, succumbed to corruption.

Another difference is that $_{LS}$*and* sentences can contain an NPI in the first conjunct[53]:

(39) John whispers anything $_{LS}$and Bill jumps to attention
(40) *John whispered anything and$_C$ Bill jumped to attention

These and similar properties are observed in Type II IaDs, according to Russell, as we will see below. Russell does not tell us how $_{LS}$*and* becomes *if* (neither do CJ, in a way) but he does point out that assimilating Type II IaDs to $_{LS}$*and* sentences, possibly accompanied by deletion of a *you* subject, may ultimately prove to be the way to go for Type II IaDs.

In summary, for Russell:

In Type I, Conjunct1 is an imperative. A covert antecedent takes us to the worlds in which the imperative is satisfied and the second conjunct is the consequent of that antecedent.

(ii) Know what I did today?

These have in common with the base VP of a Type II IaD that the missing subject can only be *you* and no other person is possible (though in Type II IaDs, missing impersonal *you* is also possible).

[53] CJ 's actual NPI examples are with IaDs.

In Type II, there is no imperative. The first conjunct *is* the antecedent of the conditional whose consequent is the second conjunct. For this reason Conjunct1 of a Type II IaD can contain an NPI and show other "conditional antecedent" properties.

Overall Summary

Han: All IaDs are the result of Derivation B
Russell: Type I IaDs undergo Derivation A
        Type II IaDs undergo Derivation B

Derivation A: the imperative first conjunct retains its imperative force. A covert antecedent takes us to the worlds in which the imperative is satisfied, and the second conjunct is the consequent of that antecedent.

Derivation B: the first conjunct *is* the antecedent of the conditional whose consequent is the second conjunct. For this reason the first conjunct of a Type II IaD can contain an NPI and show other "conditional antecedent" properties.

Finally, we come to the reported behavior of IaDs and their differences and similarities with imperatives. Recall that for Han these facts show that IaDs do not contain an imperative.
Russell, on the other hand, will try to show that *some* IaDs behave as if they contained an imperative (Type I) and some not (Type II)[54]. He claims that there is a consistency in the patterns so that the IaDs that behave differently from imperatives pattern alike and those that behave as if they contain an imperative also pattern alike.

A) Both Han and Russell discuss subjects in imperatives, though they disagree about the facts. According to Russell, some IaDs can contain a subject, others can not. Russell claims that the ones with undesirable consequents (Type II) can never contain a subject. As it is a known characteristic of the (English) imperative to take a subject, Russell concludes that Type II IaDs do not contain an imperative but Type I does.
These are Russell's examples:

Type I:

(41) Nobody steal and you'll all go to heaven.

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[54] However, it should be noted that there is actually a disagreement as to what some of the data are.

(42) Everyone tithe[55] and you'll all go to heaven.
(43) Don't you steal and you'll go to heaven.

Type II:

 (44) #Nobody tithe and you'll all go to hell.
 (45) #Everyone steal and you'll all go to hell.
 (46) #Don't you tithe and you'll go to hell.

According to Han, however, no IaD can contain a subject, not even those with desirable consequents:

(47) *Everybody come to the party and she will be happy.
(48) *Someone open the window and we'll get some fresh air.

So from these facts she concludes that IaDs do not contain imperatives, since imperatives can take subjects.

B) According to Han, no IaD can be negated with *don't*:

(49) ?Don't show up on time and you'll miss the beginning of the movie
(50) *Don't you worry so much and you'll be happier

From this she concludes that IaDs do not contain an imperative, since imperatives can be negated with *don't*:

(51) Don't move!

Russell, on the other hand, describes the facts differently. According to him, both types of IaDs can contain *don't*:

(52) Don't steal and you'll go to heaven (Type I)
(53) Don't tithe and you'll go to hell (Type II)

However, a difference between the two types shows up in their possibility to take *don't –
 subject – verb* word order.
Type I IaDs can contain the order *don't – subject – verb*; Type II cannot:

(54) Don't you steal and you'll go to heaven
(55) #Don't you tithe and you'll go to hell.

From this Russell concludes that Type II does not contain an imperative but Type I does.

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[55] To tithe: to pay one tenth of your income, especially to a church.

C) Russell says that Type I IaDs can be negated with *Do not*, and Type II cannot:

(56) Do not steal and you'll go to heaven
(57) #?Do not tithe and you'll go to hell

From this he concludes that Type II does not contain an imperative but Type I does.

Han does not discuss similar facts; she asserts that IaDs cannot be negated but gives examples only with *don't* , as above, not with *do not*.

D) According to Han, IaDs can never contain emphatic *do*. This sets them apart from imperatives, which can contain emphatic *do* (judgment Han's):

(58) Do put the light on!
(59) *Do put the light on and you'll see better.
(60) *Do come one step closer and I'll shoot.

For Russell, Type I IaDs can contain emphatic *do*; Type II cannot (judgments are Russell's):

(61) Do tithe and you'll go to heaven.
(62) #Do steal from the church and you'll go to hell.

From this he concludes that Type II does not contain an imperative but Type I does.

E) Han discusses facts from Davies 1986, actually first discussed by Bolinger 1967, and says that IaDs can contain NPIs. This sets them apart from imperatives which can never do that:

(63) *Come any closer.
(64) Come any closer and I'll shoot.
(65) Lift a finger to help her and you'll be sorry.
(66) Say one word to anyone about this and I'll never forgive you.
(67) Drink any more beer and you'll puke.

Russell, though, points out that only *some* IaDs can contain NPIs[56], namely Type II ones (and if you look at Han's examples with NPIs in IaDs, you will see that indeed all of them have undesirable consequents). Type I IaDs cannot contain an NPI. He concludes this by putting an NPI in IaDs that have Type I properties, like emphatic *do* and overt subjects:

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[56] Though not the NPI *ever*.

(68) *Do eat any raw pork and you'll contract trichinosis.
(69) *Anyone turn out the light and I'll show you my slides.
(70) *Someone lift a finger to help and we'll finish building the model
today.

From this Russell concludes that Type II does not contain an imperative, though it is still possible to conclude that Type I does.

F) Han, discussing facts from Clark 1993, says that IaDs do not contain an imperative because the subject of Conjunct1 in an IaD can be impersonal 2nd person, an option which allegedly does not exist for imperatives:

(71) Wash yourself every day and your skin gets dry.

Russell points out that the impersonal subject is an option only for Type II.
(72) is fine and it is a Type II IaD. However, (73) is meant to be a Type I, as evidenced by the *don't – subject – verb* sequence, which is possible only for Type I, according to him:

(72) Marry your sister and your kids will probably be messed up.
(73) #Don't you marry your sister and your kids will probably be OK.

However, Schwager 2006 (p. 247) claims that plain imperatives can have impersonal subjects, as in proverbs:

(74) What you can manage to do today don't postpone for tomorrow.

G) Han argues that IaDs do not contain imperatives as they can contain Conjunct1 with predicates that can never be imperatives:

(75) ?Doubt that you will succeed
(76) Doubt that you will succeed and you won't

(77) ?Know the answer
(78) Know the answer and you'll get an A

Russell does not discuss such facts.

H) Russell, inspired by Jackendoff and Cullicover 1997[57], points to an additional difference between the two types. Type I IaDs cannot contain a pronoun in the first conjunct which is bound by a quantifier in the second; Type II can:

(79) *Someone come up with a few nice stories about him and every senator will change his vote in our favor.
(80) *Everyone give him enough money/ten dollars and every senator will give us access to his files.
(81) *Don't you slander him and every senator will give you access to his files.

(82) Come up with a few nice stories about him and every senator will change his vote in your favor.
(83) Give him enough money and every senator will give you access to his files.

Han does not discuss such facts.

I) On the assumption that comma separation of conjuncts is possible only with *and*s of the same category, Russell concludes that Type I IaD has "normal" *and*, while Type II does not. That is, Type I but not Type II can have the form *p, q and s* interpreted as *If p and q, then s*. (Again, the presence of an overt subject is meant to ensure a Type I derivation, as in Russell's system, while a desirable second conjunct is not by itself sufficient to do that, since desirable conjuncts can also undergo a Type II derivation).

(84) Everyone sit down, someone turn out the lights, and I'll show you my slides.
(85) Everyone sit down and someone turn out the lights and I'll show you my slides.
(86) If everyone sits down and someone turns out the lights, I'll show you my slides.

(87) *Make a lot of noise, goof off, and you won't get a lollipop.
(88) Make a lot of noise and goof off and you won't get a lollipop.
(89) If you make a lot of noise and goof off, you won't get a lollipop.

Han does not discuss such facts.

J) Han, discussing facts from Davies 1986 and Clark 1993, says that IaDs can contain a Conjunct1 with past reference, an option not available for imperatives. This is another argument for her that IaDs do not contain imperatives:

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[57] Schwager 2006 also discusses such facts but does not present them as a difference between two types.

(90) Life was hard in those days.
      a. Say one word out of turn and they'd dock you a week's wages.
      b. Take a holiday in those days and you were regarded as a spendthrift.

Russell does not discuss such facts. Han's examples would be Type II. However, if we control for what Russell considers Type I characteristics we see that past reference is not possible in Type I:

(91) Life was easy then.
      a. *Someone give us some vegetables and we would feed our family.
      b. *Do plant some vegetables and you would feed your family.

If this is correct, then we have another difference between Type I and Type II and one that would be consistent with Russell's claim that Type II does not contain an imperative while Type I does[58].

So here is a summary:

	Type I IaD	Type II IaD
Han	Conjunct1 is not an imperative but infinitive-like. It refers to hypothetically possible worlds/becomes a conditional antecedent	
Russell	Conjunct 1 is an imperative	Conjunct 1 is infinitive-like. It becomes a conditional antecedent

Wrt Han's account, we do not get sufficient details of what happens to Conjunct1 (of any IaD). However, the fact that she characterizes it as [irrealis] means that she puts it on a par with infinitives and subjunctives and not with imperatives, even though she characterizes Conjunct1 as a "defective imperative" (p. 195).

Wrt Russell's account, again he does not give many details as to what happens with Conjunct1 of Type II IaDs, but he thinks it is infinitive-like, and not an imperative.

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[58] Schwager 2006 p.251 speculates that examples like 90 may be the result of interior monologue and that therefore "it does not have to be interpreted as prior to the utterance time, but rather as simultaneous with fictive *now*".

So in a way, Han's and Russell's accounts fall together and fair similarly in what each considers non-imperative IaDs (all IaDs for Han, Type II for Russell). Let's call both of these "conditional accounts" of (Type II) IaDs[59].

Difficulties for a conditional antecedent account of Type II IaD:

D1: We still do not have a way to make it happen.

D2: Bolinger 1967 points out that constructions like the ones we have been referring to as Type II IaDs have the property that the second conjunct must be an intrinsic consequence of the first conjunct[60]. This is why a sentence like (92) from Bolinger does not have the paraphrase in (93):

(92) Break one of your teeth and I'll take you to the dentist.
(93) If you break one of your teeth, I will take you to the dentist.

Since my taking you to the dentist is not an intrinsic consequence of you breaking a tooth, the sentence is not good. However, the $_{LS}and$ analysis of Type II does not predict this restriction[61].

And this example, also from Bolinger, fails to be read as Type II, too:

(94) *Write any letters and I'll mail them for you.

Here is another similar example that in principle should be able to undergo a Type II $_{LS}and$ derivation but fails Bolinger's "intrinsic consequence" condition:

(95) *Go see that movie and you will let me know whether you like it.

In short, the $_{LS}and$ account has nothing to say about this restriction, as the first conjunct is supposed to be just a conditional antecedent.

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[59] For Russell, a Type II IaD *is* a conditional, with Conjunct1 being its antecedent. For Han, though this is not the semantics she attempts to give (see footnote 9), she talks about IaDs being like a conditional (e.g. p. 199-200), with Conjunct1 being the antecedent.
[60] See also von Fintel and Iatridou's 2007 "automatic result".
[61] Sentence (92) can be interpreted as a Type I, but of course with a very strange imperative. If we replace "one of your teeth" with "any", then if Russell is right, the Type I interpretation should also be excluded, and (92) will become ungrammatical.

Incidentally, Bolinger also points out that statives are only good with the intrinsic consequent reading

(96) Like her and her friends will love you.
(97) *Like her and I'll introduce her to you.

(98) Own a piece of property and you get taxed mercilessly.
(99) *Own this property and I'll buy it from you

(100) Understand Chinese and you can get any of these jobs.
(101) *Understand Chinese and I need you for a teacher.

We could explain this as follows if we combine Bolinger and Russell: The bad examples are bad because statives do not make good imperatives. The good ones, the ones that satisfy the intrinsic consequence condition, don't have this problem as they are not imperatives.

D3: If non-imperative containing IaDs end up having their Conjunct1 become an antecedent for their modalized Conjunct2, why are epistemic conditionals of the kind represented in (102) not possible?

(102) Feel warm and you will have caught something. $\neq$
(103) If you feel warm you will have caught something.

Or anankastic ones:

(104) Want good cheese and you will have to go to the North End. $\neq$
(105) If you want good cheese you will have to go to the North End.

D4: IaDs of either type do not seem to be embeddable:

(106) *He thinks/says that go talk to him and you will get a prize/and he will insult you.

For Russell, Type I might be predicted to not be embeddable on the assumption that speech acts are not, and in particular that imperatives are not. However, Type II would be expected to be embeddable since they are just conditionals. For Han, all IaDs should be embeddable.
Note that the inability of the IaD to be embedded is not a function of $_{LS}and$ but of the imperative in Conjunct1, as there appears to be nothing wrong with *Johns thinks that Mary frowns and Fred shies away in fear.*

D5: Type II IaDs can still contain *don't* (though it cannot be followed by the imperative subject; see B above). This is not explained under the conditional antecedent account, in which Conjunct1 is an infinitive.

D6: There are languages where, unlike in English, the imperative is formally different from other verb forms. In these languages, it is entirely possible to form a Type II IaD with a conjunct that is overtly in the imperative. One such language is Greek. The only obvious way to ensure that it is Type II is to have an undesirable second conjunct, as tests A-F are mostly inapplicable:

(107) Fae   ena apo afta   ke   tha pethanis   mesa se 24 ores
       Eat.IMP   one from these and FUT die   within 24 hours
     'Eat one of these and you will die within 24 hours'

This is a straightout counterexample for Russell, who does not even mention such cases.

Han does talk about languages like these, specifically Greek and German, in fact. She says that Conjunct1 in those cases is interpreted like a real imperative, unlike Conjunct1-s in English. For these cases, she proposes what later Schwager and Russell proposed for Type I IaDs, namely a true imperative meaning followed by a modally subordinated Conjunct2.
For IaDs with desirable consequents this seems straightforward for Han (as it did for Schwager and Russell). For IaDs with undesirable consequents, Han says that these still contain an imperative. However, the imperative is interpreted in an ironic way (p. 192). In this chapter she does not say more about this and one wonders why an imperative would have to be embedded to be able to be interpreted ironically. However, in a different chapter (p. 169), she talks about imperatives being used as dares and threats, as in *Go ahead. Hit me. You'll be sorry.* So maybe this is what she has in mind when she talks about the ironic uses of imperatives but she does not say anything else about what would the permit this "ironic" reading of an imperative.

An additional difficulty with Han's view, as also pointed out by Schwager, is that even in the languages with overt imperative in Conjunct1, the subject of Conjunct1 of a Type II IaD can be interpreted as impersonal second person. This is a problem for Han because an impersonal subject is supposed to be available only for "stripped" imperatives, that is, the ones that lack [directive]. However, Schwager comes to the rescue, in a way, because she points out that plain imperatives can also have generic subjects sometimes:

(108) What you can manage to do today, don't postpone for tomorrow.

Why does Han have a different account for IaDs with undesirable consequents in Greek and German from those in English? The answer is simply that it does not seem possible to duplicate the differences between the Conjunct1 of (Type II) IaDs and the Imperative that we saw above.

Recall that for Han, Conjunct1 in English is a "defective imperative" (p.195). That is, it is an imperative that has been stripped of its [directive] feature. It is actually not clear why she goes this way, because she could have just called it an infinitive, given that infinitives have only the [irrealis] feature for her. At any rate, given that she considers Conjunct1 a stripped imperative, the question arises why Greek and German cannot have a "stripped imperative" either. This way she would be able to collapse the accounts for all three languages. Han's answer to this question is the following (p.195):

"… English uses bare verb forms for imperatives, whereas German, Korean, and Modern Greek have distinctive morphology for imperative verbs. In English, the absence of some of the morphosyntactic features associated with the imperative operator would have no effect on the bare verbal form. But in languages with distinctive morphology on the verb for imperatives, the absence of some of the morphosyntactic features of imperative operator would likely to have an effect on the verbal form. Thus, in these languages, there are no defective imperatives that look just like imperatives".[62]

In addition, a further complication of the crosslinguistic picture is the following:

In Greek, where, as we saw above, (Type II) IaDs with an overt imperative are just fine, Type II IaDs with the subjunctive are not possible.

Recall that Greek is one of those languages where the subjunctive can be used to express commands:

(109) Na erthis   edho   amesos!
       Come-Subj here   immediately

Type I IaDs with the subjunctive are just in Greek:

(110)   Na meletisis poli ke   tha perasis   tis eksetasis
        Study-Subj   hard and   FUT pass the exams
       'Study hard and you will pass the exams"

However, Type II IaDs with the subjunctive are completely out:

(111) *Na to fas afto   ke tha pethanis   mesa se 24 ores
       Eat-Subj this   and   you will die within 24 hours

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[62] This rationale does not seem very clear. For example, from "in languages with distinctive morphology on the verb for imperatives, the absence of some of the morphosyntactic features of imperative operator would likely to have an effect on the verbal form", one could have just as well concluded that since the form is still imperative, the theory that permits stripping of an imperative is not correct.

Schwager 2006[63]:

Schwager, like Russell, also thinks that there are cases of speech act conjunction where the first conjunct is an imperative and the second conjunct is modally subordinated to the first (p.226, fn 4). However, she does not refer to these as "IaDs". She reserves this term for what we have been calling "Type II IaD". However, we will continue to use terms Type I and Type II for consistency.

Schwager, like Han and Russell, also wants to turn Conjunct1 of a Type II IaD into a conditional antecedent.

However, unlike Han, who thinks that Conjunct1 is a stripped imperative, and unlike Russell, who thinks that Conjunct1 is no imperative at all, Schwager thinks that Conjunct1 is an honest-to-goodness imperative.

Like Russell (and earlier than him), Schwager sees Type II IaDs as another case of Cullicover and Jackendoff's $_{LS}and$ and she wants an account that will unify all $_{LS}and$ cases.

She argues that "$_{LS}and$ comes with a special intonation contour that triggers mapping of the entire proposition embedded under a modal operator in the first conjunct into the restrictor of the modal operator" (p.258)

More specifically:

In conditionals, the antecedent restricts a modal, and the "consequent" is the scope of that modal. In Type II IaDs, the modal is contained in Conjunct1. The modal's complement in Conjunct1 becomes the modal's restrictor, that is, the conditional antecedent. Conjunct2 becomes the modal's scope, that is, the conditional consequent.

Schematically:

(112)   [Modal (α)]$_{Conjunct1}$ $_{LS}and$ [(β)]$_{Conjunct2}$
         $\rightarrow$
         Modal   [(α)] $_{restrictor}$ [(β)]$_{scope}$

This means that the first conjunct of $_{LS}and$ should always contain a modal. This is the modal that gets restricted by (the complement of the modal in) Conjunct1.

For the basic CJ cases, that we saw above, she says that present tense marks the presence of a generic operator, which plays the role of the modal in (112).

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[63] Schwager discusses Han's work but not Russell's, which it precedes.

Imperatives can be the first conjuncts of $_{LS}$*and* because they too are modalized in her account. And this is how she gets Conjunct2 to be a conditional antecedent:

In Type II IaDs, $_{LS}$*and* is semantically empty; it does not contribute conjunction. There is a modal, however. Specifically, the modal whose presence is marked with the imperative form in Conjunct1. This modal does not get applied to the prejacent material in Conjunct1 in the way it does in a regular imperative. Instead, the prejacent material in Conjunct1 gets mapped into the restrictor of that modal and Conjunct2 becomes the modal scope.

Where does the "special intonation" of the initial quote come into play? Schwager, following Halliday 1967, talks about how a sentence like (113) is ambiguous:

(113) (sign on an escalator):
      Dogs must be carried.

This sentence has the following two readings:

(114) In all the worlds compatible with the law in which there is an event involving this escalator and a dog, the dog is carried.

$(\forall w' \in f(w))\ [\exists x\ \exists e\ (\text{dog'}_{w'}(x)\ \text{on-this-escalator'}(x)(e))][\text{carried'}_{w'}(x)(e)]$

(115) In all the worlds compatible with the law in which there is an event involving this escalator, there is a dog that is carried.

$(\forall w' \in f(w))\ [\exists e\ (\text{on-this-escalator'}(e))]\ [\exists x\ [\text{dog'}(x)\ \&\ \text{carried'}_{w'}(x)(e)]$

In the first reading, *dogs* is in the restrictor of the universal modal. In the second reading it is not.

In the first reading, *dogs* is deaccented. In the second reading it is accented.

In other words, deaccenting is a mark of being mapped in the restrictor of the modal.

Schwager says the same holds for the modal that is in an imperative. We can map an indefinite in the scope, as in (116), or the restrictor of the modal in the imperative, as in (117):

(116) Kauf   dir   einen Hund!
         Buy.Imp you.Dat   a dog
         'Buy yourself a dog!'

(117) Überleg   dir   eine Trennung gut!

Consider.Imp you.Dat a separation well
'If you consider a separation, consider it well'

With *LSand* , though, we see that Conjunct1 *must* get mapped into the restrictor. That is, Conjunct1 must be deaccented. Otherwise, the properties characteristic of IaDs are not possible. We see this by the blocking of such properties with the appearance of a low boundary tone after Conjunct1. For example, in the presence of the low boundary tone, the pronoun in Conjunct1 cannot be bound by the quantifier in Conjunct2.

(118) Sei   nett zu ihm (L%) und jeder Politiker   wird dir   helfen
     Be.Imp nice to him   and every politician   will   you.Dat help
   'Be nice to him and every politician will help you'

("L%" indicates a low boundary tone, following Pierrehumbert and Beckman 1988.)

So the deaccented Conjunct1 shows that it has been mapped to the restrictor of an operator. Which operator? The one in the imperative.

Our summarizing table then looks like this now:

	Type I IaD	Type II IaD
Han	Conjunct 1 is not an imperative but infinitive-like. It refers to hypothetically possible worlds/becomes a conditional antecedent. Conjunct2 is the consequent.	
Russell	Conjunct 1 is an imperative. Conjunct2 is modally subordinated	Conjunct 1 is infinitive-like. It becomes a conditional antecedent. Conjunct2 is the consequent.
Schwager	Conjunct 1 is an imperative. Conjunct2 is modally subordinated	Conjunct1 is an imperative. It becomes a conditional antecedent. Conjunct 2 is the consequent

How does Schwager's account compared to Han's and Russell's turns Type II IaDs into conditionals? Let's look at the difficulties for Han and Russell that we saw above.

Wrt D1: Schwager has more of an attempt at a compositional account than Han or Russell (who doesn't really claim to have one).

Wrt D2: Schwager herself admits that she cannot account for the intrinsic or automatic consequence relationship between Conjunct1 and Conjunct2, discussing cases from Bolinger 1967 and von Fintel and Iatridou 2007.

Wrt D3: She does acknowledge that Type II IaDs do not make it as epistemic conditionals. She attributes this to the fact that (the modal in) a plain imperative never expresses epistemic necessity. But what is the nature of the modal exactly? More on this in Q1 below.

Wrt D4: She cannot account for the fact that IaDs cannot be embedded, nor does she mention the fact.

Wrt D5: Her account does not explain why Type II IaDs allegedly behave differently with respect to negation than regular imperatives. However, she disputes the reality of these facts.

Wrt D6: Since in her account Type II IaDs contain a true imperative, the appearance of overtly marked imperatives in languages like Greek and German fits very well into her account, as she herself notes. However, the difference between imperatives and subjunctives in Type II IaDs she does not mention.

Schwager herself notes some difficulties for her account:

– She predicts that other necessity operators in Conjunct1 of $_{LS}$*and* should also work but this is not true (point attributed to Manfred Krifka). The following fails as a conditional:

(119) You must come in time and you'll get a seat.

– It is unclear how sufficiency modals would work in the $_{LS}$*and* construction (von Fintel and Iatridou 2007):

(120) You only have to look at him and he shies away in fear.

– She thinks her account wrongly predicts that IaDs could express restrictions on the modal background of imperatives but this is not true:

(121) If you leave your house, take an umbrella with you. ≠
    Leave your house and you take an umbrella with you.

But there are some additional questions:

Q1: Schwager says she predicts the absence of epistemic readings of Type II IaDs since the modal in a plain imperative does not (for reasons that she does not get into) have any epistemic readings. However, the modal is supposed to be quite underspecified. She might have said that the modal is deontic, but that will not do either, as Type II IaDs are not deontic either. However, she does say that the modal is performative. What happens to the performativity of the modal in Type II IaDs?

Q2: The syntax-semantics mapping seems suboptimal: Schwager has left downward movement of the complement of the imperative into the restriction of the modal and then allows insertion of an abstractor capturing the trace left behind by the complement, and application of that abstract to the second conjunct. The operations "get" the right result but they are custom-made for this construction. As an attempt to fit the transformation of IaDs into a conditional by means of independently known operations, it fails.

<u>Portner</u> does not say anything about IaDs, so let us not put words in his mouth.

<u>Resurfacing:</u>

What does all this tell us about the question of whether the meaning of the imperative is present in the morphosyntax?

If Han and Schwager are right, something happens to the imperative in Type II IaDs. This means that whatever there is in the imperative, it has to be able to turn into a conditional antecedent.
If Russell is right, at least in English, there is no issue with Type II IaDs as these are not imperatives.

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